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Abstract
This Note will propose five steps towards establishing an effective method of bringing terror-
ists to justice. Part I of this Note will detail the facts surrounding the Achille Lauro incident. Part
II will discuss the laws governing extradition, including the obligations of Egypt and the United
States arising under the United States-Egypt Extradition Treaty, the Convention Against the Tak-
ing of Hostages, and the doctrine of mala captus bene delentus. Part III will also discuss the
international community’s historical inability to define terrorism. Part III will examine the legal
precedent for acts of abduction. Part IV details the criticism of the use of abduction as an alter-
native to extradition, and examines the threat abduction poses to the international legal system,
which depends upon voluntary compliance to be effective.
AN ANALYSIS OF THE ACHILLE LAURO AFFAIR:
TOWARDS AN EFFECTIVE AND LEGAL
METHOD OF BRINGING
INTERNATIONAL
TERRORISTS TO JUSTICE
INTRODUCTION
On October 10, 1985 United States Navy fighter planes
intercepted an Egyptian commercial aircraft' and forced it to
land at a North Atlantic Treaty Organization2 (NATO) airfield
in Sigonella, Italy. The mid-air interception was part of a plan
by the United States to abduct members of the Palestine Liber-
1. Gwertzman, U.S. Intercepts Jet Carrying Hiackers: Fighters Divert It To NATO Base
In Italy; Gunmen Face Trial In Slaying Of Hostage, N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1985, at Al, col.
6. The legality of the diversion of aircraft is governed by international treaty, which
prohibits diverting a commercial airliner over the high seas except as a last resort.
See Convention On International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, § 3.8, 61 Stat. 1180,
T.I.A.S. No. 1591, 15 U.N.T.S. 295 [hereinafter cited as Chicago Convention].
One authority has stated that the Egyptian aircraft in this instance "was not a
civilian airliner.., for hire... it was a state aircraft used as a getaway vehicle." Thus,
presumably, the Chicago Convention would not apply to this incident. Lowenfeld &
Glynn, Analyzing the Applicable Laws in the Achille Lauro Aftermath, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 1, 1985,
at 1, col. 3. But see Egyptian Pilot Reports a U.S. Threat To Shoot, N.Y. Times, Oct. 17,
1985, at A13, col. 3 (claim by Egypt that diversion violated international aviation
law).
The diversion by the United States had precedent. For example, in August,
1973, Israeli fighter aircraft diverted a Middle East Airlines flight which was traveling
from Beirut to Iraq. The commercial aircraft was forced to land in Israel and the
plane was searched in hopes of finding Dr. George Habash, leader of the Popular
Front for the Liberation of Palestine, on board. He was not, and the aircraft was
released. Friedman, Israelis Intercept A Libyan Civil Jet And Then Let It Go, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 5, 1986, at A8, col. 5.
On February 4, 1986, Israeli jets intercepted a Libyan executive aircraft over the
Mediterranean and forced it to land in Israel. It was thought that Palestine Libera-
tion Organization member Abu Nidal was on board. After a search revealed that the
only passengers were Syrian politicians and militia officials, the plane was released.
Id. at AI, col. 1.
2. The North Atlantic Treaty, Aug. 24, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, T.I.A.S. No. 1964
[hereinafter cited as NATO Treaty]. The parties to the treaty in order of the date of
ratification are: Canada (1949), United Kingdom (1949), Belgium (1949), Luxem-
bourg (1949), Norway (1949), United States (1949), Iceland (1949), Netherlands
(1949), Denmark (1949), France (1949), Italy (1949), Portugal (1949), Greece
(1952), Turkey (1952), Federal Republic of Germany (1955), Spain (1982). In 1966,
the Government of France withdrew French personnel from NATO headquarters,
terminated the assignment of French forces to the NATO international commands,
and asked NATO to remove its international headquarters from French territory.
France intended to withdraw from NATO in order to maintain an independent mili-
tary presence in Europe. Although it no longer plays an active role, France remains a
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ation Front 3 and bring them back to the United States to stand
trial for their hijacking of the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro
Member Country of NATO. See NATO INFORMATION SERVICE, NATO FACTS AND
FIGURES 57 (1976).
The NATO Treaty establishes "a collective defense arrangement for the North
Atlantic area within the framework of the United Nations Charter and based upon the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by article 51 of the
Charter." Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, S. Exec. Rep. No.
8, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., Pt 11 (1949). The NATO Treaty's objective is "to assist in
achieving the primary purpose of the United Nations-the maintenance of peace and
security." Id. Pt. I.
The NATO Treaty's relevant provisions are as follows:
Article 2
The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful
and friendly international relations ... and will encourage economic collab-
oration between any or all of them.
Article 3
[T]he Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effec-
tive self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and
collective capacity to resist armed attack.
Article 5
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in
Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all ....
Article 9
The Parties hereby establish a council, on which each of them shall be
represented, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this
Treaty .... The council shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be neces-
sary; in particular ... a defense committee.
Article 10
The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European
state ... to accede to this Treaty.
63 Stat. 2241, 2242-46, T.I.A.S. No. 1964 (1949).
3. Although the Palestinians committed the act of kidnapping on a ship, for the
purposes of this Note they will be referred to as hijackers. The hijackers professed to
be members of the Palestine Liberation Front, a radical faction of the Palestine Liber-
ation Organization (PLO). The PLO is comprised of eight separate political groups
dedicated to establishing a Palestinian homeland in Israel. The PLO is governed by a
400 member Palestinian National Council. Yasir Arafat, who controls the largest
political group under the PLO banner, Fatah, has been the PLO Chairman since
1969. Is There An Alternative?, The Economist, Dec. 21-Jan. 3, 1986, at 26; Bergen,
Even With A Name It's Hard To Know Who The Hiackers Are, N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1985, at
A9, col. 2. The Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) is thought to be one of the original
umbrella groups of the PLO, which broke away from the main body in 1982 after the
Israeli invasion of Lebanon. The PLF is reportedly led by Abu Nidal. Id. "Abu Nidal
may be the deadliest terrorist alive .... Over the past twelve years [he] has molded
his organization ... into a fanatical, amorphously structured terrorist band with be-
tween 200 and 500 adherents. They have been blamed for more than 100 terrorist
attacks." Master of Mystery and Murder, Time, Jan. 13, 1986, at 31; cf. Suro, 4 KilledAs
Bomb Rips T. WA. Plane on Way To Athens, N.Y. Times, Apr. 3, 1986, at AI, col. 6 (latest
terrorist act allegedly masterminded by Abu Nidal).
330 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 9:328
and murder of a United States citizen.4
Abduction is the seizure of a person by the agents of one
state from another, non-cooperative state.5 Abduction is tech-
nically violative of international laws governing sovereignty6
4. See infra notes 140-50 and accompanying text. See generally Tagliabue, Ship
Carrying 400 Is Seized; Hiackers Demand Release of 50 Palestinians In Israel, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 8, 1985, A1, at col. 6; Apple, Jr., Change In Course, This Time Reagan LetActions Do
His Talking, N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1985, § 4, at 1, col. 1; see also Getting Even, News-
week, Oct. 21, 1985, at 21-32. The ship had been carrying 680 passengers, including
sixty-two United States citizens, but before the hijacking many left the ship at Alexan-
dria for sightseeing. Three hundred and fifty crew and some 100 passengers re-
mained on board theAchille Lauro for the sail to Port Said. N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1985,
at Al, col. 6. Upon landing, the diverted EgyptAir Boeing 737 was surrounded by a
United States military unit, which itself was surrounded by Italian police. After a
brief confrontation, the hijackers were taken into custody by the Italians. See
Gwertzman, U.S. Intercepts Jet Carrying Hiackers; Fighters Divert It To NA TO Base In Italy;
Gunmen Face Trial In Slaying Of Hostage, N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1985, at Al, col. 6; see also
Getting Even, Newsweek, Oct. 21, 1985, at 25; Apple, Jr., Change In Course, This Time
Reagan Let His Actions Do His Talking, N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1985, § 4, at 1, col. 2
(explanation and analysis of confrontation).
5. 6 M.C. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, UNITED STATES LAW AND
PRACTICE V § 1-1 (Feb. 1983); see also I.A. SHEARER, EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL
LAw 72-76 (1971); Note, Unraveling the Gordian Knot. The United States Law of Interna-
tional Extradition and the Political Offender Exception, 3 FORDHAM INT'L L.F. 141, 160-63
(the FORDHAM INT'L L.F. has been succeeded by the FORDHAM INT'L L.J.) (general
background on abduction). Extralegal alternatives to extradition fall into two catego-
ries, abduction and unlawful seizure. 6 M.C. BASSIOUNI, supra, at V § 1-1. Both in-
volve one state removing a person or persons to another state against their will:
(1) abduction of a person by the agents of a state other than the one in which
he is present without the knowledge or consent of the state of refuge;
and,
(2) the [unlawful] seizure of a person by the agents or [sic] one state and his
informal surrender to the agents of another state without formal or legal
process.
Id. (emphasis added).
6. 6 M.C. BASSIOUNI, supra note 5, at V § 5-3. Sovereignty is defined as the right
of states to "be their own ultimate authority in determining their behavior." W. LEVI,
CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: A CONCISE INTRODUCTION 16 (1979).
Sovereignty is a right recognized by numerous international agreements. See,
e.g., U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4; Declaration on Principles Of International Law
Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-Operation Among States in Accordance with
the Charter of the United Nations, 25 UNGAOR, Annexes (Agenda Item 85), U.N.
Doc. A/8082 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Declaration on Principles].
International courts have historically enforced the concept of sovereignty. See
Island of Palmas Case (U.S. v. Neth.), 2 U.N. Rep. Int'l Arb. Awards 829 (1928);
Western Sahara, 1975 I.CJ. 12 (advisory opinion) (both involve judicial support for
state sovereignty); see also L. HENKIN, R.C. PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER & H. SMIT, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 43, 99-103 (1980) [hereinafter cited as L. HENKIN] (analysis of Island of
Palmas and Western Sahara decisions). Sovereignty and territorial integrity are re-
lated concepts. Territorial integrity dictates that one state "may not exercise its
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and legal process.7 Yet, states have historically pursued acts of
abduction when they have determined that legitimate efforts to
secure the extradition, arrest, and prosecution of a fugitive had
failed or would not be likely to succeed.'
power in any form in the territory of another state." L. HENKIN, supra, at 46; see also 6
M.C. BASSIOUNI, supra note 5, at V § 5-3 (territoriality and state sovereignty).
7. 6 M.C. BASSIOUNI, supra note 5, at V § 1-2 and § 5-3; see also The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, 3 U.N.GAOR, Annexes (Agenda Item 58), U.N. Doc.
A/3/217, arts. 9, 10 (1948); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 21
U.N.GAOR, Annexes (Agenda Item 62), U.N. Doc. A/6546, art. 9 (1966) (interna-
tional agreements which support legal process rights).
8. See Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886) (warrant for arrest could not be prop-
erly served); Ex Parte Soblen, [1963] 2 Q.B. 243, reprinted in 8 BRIT. INT'L L. CASES
477 (1971) (plaintiff indicted for espionage in United States but fled to Israel where
offense not extraditable); The Attorney General of the Government of Israel v. Adolf
Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 5 (Israel, Dist. Ct. of Jerusalem, 1961) (previous requests for
extradition denied for political reasons by Government of Argentina). In the Achille
Lauro incident Egypt was obligated to either prosecute the hijackers or extradite them
to the United States under the Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, 34 U.N.
GAOR, Annexes (Agenda Item 113), U.N. Doc. A/34/819 (1979) [hereinafter cited.
as Hostage Convention]. The Hostage Convention provides in relevant part:
Article 6
1. Upon being satsified that the circumstances so warrant, any State
Party in the territory of which the alleged offender is present shall, in ac-
cordance with its laws, take him into custody or take other measures to en-
sure his presence for such time as is necessary to enable any criminal or
extradition proceedings to be instituted. That State Party shall immediately
make a preliminary inquiry into the facts.
2. The custody or other measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this
article shall be notified without delay directly or through the Secretary-Gen-
eral of the United Nations to:
(d). The state of which the hostage is a national or if he is a stateless person, in the
territory of which he has his habitual residence.
Article 8
1. The State Party in the territory of which the alleged offender is found shall, if it does
not extradite him, be obliged, without exception whatsoever and whether or not the of-
fence was committed in its territory, to submit the case to its competent authorities for the
purpose of prosecution, through proceedings in accordance with the laws of that State.
Those authorities shall take their decision in the same manner as in the case
of any ordinary offense of a grave nature under the law of that State.
Id. arts. 6, 8 (emphasis added). Under the United States-Egypt Extradition Treaty,
April 22, 1875, United States-Ottoman Empire, 19 Stat. 572; T.S. 270, 10 Bevans 642
[hereinafter cited as United States-Egypt Extradition Treaty], both states agree that,
"persons convicted of or charged with the crimes [specified herein], and being fugi-
tives from justice, should ... be reciprocally delivered up." Id. preamble. The pro-
cedure for extradition is contained in articles 1 and 5 as follows:
Article 1
1. [This Treaty is only applicable if there exists] such evidence of criminality
as, according to the laws of the place where the fugitive or person so
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This Note will propose five steps towards establishing an
effective method of bringing terrorists to justice. The first step
involves creating a legal framework for the identification of ter-
rorist acts, analogous to the laws of war embodied in the Ge-
neva Conventions of 1949 (Geneva Conventions).9 The sec-
ond step would be the formulation of a concrete, universal def-
inition of terrorism based upon acts committed outside of the
charged shall be found, would justify his or her apprehension and committ-
ment for trial, if the crime had been there committed.
Article 5
Requisitions for the surrender of fugitives from justice shall be made by
the respective diplomatic agents of the contracting parties ... The Presi-
dent of the United States ... may then issue a warrant for the apprehension
of the fugitive [to accompany the requisition]. If it should then be decided
that, according to law and evidence, the extradition, is due pursuant to the
treaty, the fugitive may be given up according to the forms prescribed in
such cases.
Id. arts. 1 and 5; cf. Crimes and Criminal Procedure, 18 U.S.C. § 3187 (1982) (provi-
sional arrest and detention within extraterritorial jurisdiction).
In the Achille Lauro affair, it appears that the United States did not have enough
time to make a formal request for extradition of the Palestinian hijackers. Egypt thus
had the obligation under the Hostage Convention to either prosecute them, or to
detain them for a time adequate to provide the United States with an opportunity to
institute formal extradition procedures. Egypt did neither, and the United States
attempted to abduct the hijackers. Gwertzman, U.S. Intercepts Jet Carrying Hyackers:
Fighters Divert It To NATO Base In Italy; Gunman Face Trial In Slaying Of Hostage, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 11, 1985, at AI, col. 6.
President Reagan ... ordered the dramatic military action after hearing
that Egypt had turned down repeated American pleas to prosecute the four
gunmen and was flying them to freedom.
Id. (quoting White House spokesman Larry Speakes).
Egypt apparently negotiated an agreement with the PLO, that allowed PLO
members to remove the hijackers. See Getting Even, Newsweek, Oct. 21, 1985, at 26-
28 (Egypt then provided the hijackers with safe passage out of Egypt to Tunisia,
headquarters of the PLO. Egypt apparently acted in an effort to establish political
leverage in the Arab world, particularly to aid Egypt's position as a mediator in the
Middle East peace process. See id.; see also Picking Up The Pace, Time, Nov. 4, 1985 at
34; The Teflon Palestinian, The Economist, Dec. 21-Jan. 3, 1986, at 25. But see Getting
Even, Newsweek, Oct. 21, 1985, at 31 (Egypt may have supplied Washington with
covert intelligence about the precise location of the EgyptAir flight carrying the
Achille Lauro hijackers).
9. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12,
1949, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter cited as Geneva Convention
Relative to Prisoners of War]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civil-
ian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287
[hereinafter cited as Geneva Convention Relative to Civilians]; see infra notes 213-20
and accompanying text (support for the laws of war as a framework to fight interna-
tional terrorism).
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framework created in step one.'0 Step three involves construct-
ing an international agreement by which acts of terrorism, as
defined in step two, would be added to existing extradition
treaties as an offense for which extradition is legally war-
ranted. " Step four calls for the creation of a permanent inter-
national tribunal with mandatory jurisdiction over terrorist
crimes when states cannot or will not prosecute terrorists in
national courts.' 2 The fifth step would add terrorism to the list
of international "crimes against humanity" with concurrent
universal jurisdiction over the offense. 13 Rather than trading
one ineffective legal process for another, this proposal aims to
depoliticize international extradition procedures, and thus,
work towards the elimination of terrorism.
Part I of this Note will detail the facts surrounding the
Achille Lauro incident.' 4 Part II will discuss the laws governing
extradition, including the obligations of Egypt and the United
States arising under the United States-Egypt Extradition
Treaty,' 5 the Convention Against the Taking of Hostages' 6
(Hostage Convention), and the doctrine of mala captus bene
delentus.'7 Part III will also discuss the international commu-
10. See infra notes 233-34 and accompanying text.
11. See infra note 235 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 236-41 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 242-43 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 21-40 and accompanying text.
15. United States-Egypt Extradition Treaty, supra note 8; see supra note 8 and
accompanying text (obligations of the United States and Egypt under the treaty).
16. Hostage Convention, supra note 8; see supra note 8 and accompanying text
(obligations of Egypt and the United States under the Convention).
17. The roman law maxim mala captus bene detentus translates to "improperly cap-
tured, properly detained." In the United States this maxim is known as the Ker-Frisbie
doctrine, and under it United States courts will not inquire as to how the presence of
a fugitive was secured before the Bench. 6 M.C. BASSIOUNI, supra note 5, at V § 1-2;
see also Lowenfeld & Glynn, Analyzing the Applicable Laws in the Achille Lauro Aftermath,'
N.Y.L.J., Nov. 1, 1985, at 3, col. 2; RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF THE FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES § 432, reporter's note 2 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985)
(support and analysis of maxim). The Ker-Frisbie doctrine is derived from two
landmark United States Supreme Court cases which have upheld the validity of in
personam jurisdiction when secured by extralegal methods, most notably abduction.
See Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886); Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952); see also
United States v. Cadena, 585 F.2d 1252 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Yanagita,
552 F.2d 940 (2d Cir. 1977); Glasgow v. State, 469 P.2d 682 (Alaska 1970) (support-
ing Ker-Frisbie); Green, The Eichmann Case, 23 MOD. L. REV. 507, 509 (1963) (citing
English case law supporting mala captus bene detentus).
In Ker, plaintiff was indicted in Cook County, Illinois, for larceny and embezzle-
ment. He was subsequently convicted of larceny. At the time of trial he was living in
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nity's historical inability to define terrorism. Part III will ex-
amine the legal precedent for acts of abduction, including the
abduction of Adolf Eichmann by Israeli agents in 1960. I1 Part
III will also discuss the national interests which compel states
to ignore international agreements for political exigencies.' 9
Part IV details the criticism of the use of abduction as an alter-
native to extradition, and examines the threat abduction poses
to the international legal system, which depends upon volun-
tary compliance to be effective.20
I. THE ACHILLE LAURO AFFAIR: THE FACTS
On Monday, October 7, 1985 members of the Palestine
Liberation Front,2' a splinter group of the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO) seized the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro,
which had been sailing in Egyptian territorial waters between
the Egyptian cities of Alexandria and Port Said.22 Among the
Peru. The President of the United States, at the request of the Governor of Illinois,
issued a warrant for plaintiff's arrest pursuant to the existing treaty of extradition
between the United States and Peru, and a law enforcement agent was authorized to
take plaintiff into custody. The warrant was never issued, and plaintiff was instead
forcibly abducted and brought back to the United States. 119 U.S. at 437-38.
Presumably, the warrant could not be served because at the time of the agent's
arrival in Lima, Chilean troops were occupying the capital. Chile was at that time at
war with Peru. 6 M.C. BASSIOUNI, supra note 5, at V § 4-1. The Supreme Court held
that plaintiff was not denied due process rights, which, the Court held, guaranteed
only that an accused be indicted and tried "according to the forms and modes pre-
scribed for such trials" and the method of securing plaintiff's appearance before a
court, no matter how irregular, "[does not entitle the accused] to say that he should
not be tried at all for the crime with which he is charged in a regular indictment."
119 U.S. at 440.
In Frisbie, the Supreme Court, relying on the decision in Ker, held that a Michigan
state prisoner who claimed he had been "forcibly seized, handcuffed, blackjacked,"
and brought before court on a charge of murder was not denied his due process
rights. 342 U.S. at 520. The Court held that, "the power of a court to try a person
for a crime is not impaired by the fact that he had been brought within the court's
jurisdiction by reason of a 'forcible abduction'." Id. at 522.
18. See infra notes 159-77 and accompanying text; see also The Attorney General
of the Government of Israel v. Adolf Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 5 (Israel, Dist. Ct. ofJeru-
salem, 1961).
19. See infra notes 212-14 and accompanying text (support for the notion that
states place national interests over those of the international community).
20. See infra notes 191, 212 and accompanying text (support for the notion that
extralegal acts threaten the stability of the international community).
21. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (identification of the hijackers as
members of the Palestine Liberation Front, the history of the group, and its leader
Abu Nidal).
22. Tagliabue, Ship Carrying 400 Is Seized: Hyackers Demand Release Of 50 Palestini-
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passengers were eighteen United States citizens.2 3 The PLO
hijackers, who had slipped aboard the vessel posing as mere
passengers, threatened to blow up the ship at anchor in Port
Said, unless the Government of Israel agreed to release fifty
Palestinians held prisoner in Israel.24
On Wedenesday, October 9, when it appeared the Israeli
Government would not negotiate with the hijackers,25 Egypt
permitted the PLO to "remove ' 26 the terrorists from the
ship.27 United States Government officials then learned that
the hijackers had killed a sixty-nine year old United States citi-
zen, an invalid who had been partially paralyzed and confined
to a wheelchair. 28 On October 10, 1985 the Egyptian Govern-
ans In Israel, N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1985, at Al, col. 6. The hijacking, hostage-taking
and murder of a United States citizen occurred while the Achille Lauro was sailing
between the Egyptian cities of Alexandria and Port Said. Id.; see also supra note 4 and
accompanying text (planned route of the cruise ship); cf. Third United Nations Con-
ference on the Law of the Sea, 37 U.N.GAOR Annexes (Agenda Item 28), U.N. Doc.
A/conf.62/122 (1982) (declarations and reservations of Egypt concerning the contig-
uous zone). Under United Nations Treaty, Egypt's contiguous zone is recognized as
extending twenty-four nautical miles from its shores, and thus Egypt may validly as-
sert jurisdiction over that area as an extension of its territory. Id.
23. Cf supra note 4 and accompanying text (43 United States citizens left the
ship to travel to Port Said).
24. Tagliabue, Ship Carrying 400 Is Seized: Hijackers Demand Release of 50 Palestini-
ans in Israel, N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1985, at Al, col. 6. The Palestinian prisoners had
been captured by Israel during the course of various raids on PLO guerilla camps in
Lebanon. Friedman, Jailed Palestinians: Hundreds Held, N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1985, at
A10, col. 1.
25. The Israeli Government's official position was that no deal would be made in
which the 50 prisoners would be released in exchange for the release of the Achille
Lauro hijackers. Prial, Israel Firm on Terror Policy, But Seems Willing to Help, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 9, 1985, at A8, col. 1.
26. Egypt did not arrest the hijackers, but rather allowed a PLO intermediary;
Mohammad Abul Abbas, to remove the Palestinians and accompany them off of the
ship. See Gwertzman, State Department Angry At Speedy Accord With Gunmen, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 10, 1985, at AI, col. 3. Abbas is himself a much-wanted terrorist guerilla leader.
Id.; see also Getting Even, Newsweek, Oct. 21, 1985, at 26. But see You Can Feel The
Damage, Time, Oct. 28, 1985, at 26 (statement by Egypt's President that he had no
idea of Abul Abbas' past).
27. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (Egypt allowed hijackers to be re-
moved from ship without arrest); Schumacher, Arafat Asks That Gunmen Be Turned Over
To PLO, N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1985, at A11, col. 2.
28. Miller, Hyackers Surrender To Egyptians; Passenger Slain, 400 Are Safe; U.S. Assails
Deal With Captors, N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1985, at Al, col. 6. The individual slain by the
hijackers was Mr. Leon Klinghoffer of New York, New York. He was the only casualty
of the incident. His murder, which was apparently unplanned and unprovoked, was a
demonstration that the hijackers "meant business." See, e.g., "We Are Losing Patience",
N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1985, at A9, col. 5 (transcript of hijackers' radio communica-
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ment reported that it did not know where the Palestinians had
gone, 29 but United States intelligence sources learned3 0 that
the hijackers had boarded an Egyptian commercial aircraft en-
route to Tunisia. It is alleged that the Egyptian Government
sent the hijackers to Tunisia to stand trial before the chairman
and National Ruling Council of the PLO,3 even though the
PLO has no authority to assert jurisdiction because it is not a
state. 2
While the aircraft was in flight above the Mediterranean,
the Government of Tunisia denied the Egyptian aircraft the
right to land. 3 United States fighter planes then forced the
tions); cf. H.R. Res. 294, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (resolution commending the
President for acting against the terrorists who killed United States citizen Leon
Klinghoffer); Leon Klinghoffer's Legacy, Wall St.J., Oct. 17, 1985, at 28, col. 1 (the effect
of the death of Leon Klinghoffer on the Middle East peace process). "Mr. Klinghof-
fer's legacy will be to shatter [the] decades-old illusion of a Middle East 'peace pro-
cess' and thus establish a more realistic basis for peace itself." Id.
29. Getting Even, Newsweek, Oct. 21, 1985, at 22. Egypt claimed that in allowing
the hijackers to return to the PLO for trial, it was giving Yasir Arafat the opportunity
to prove his recent denunciation of indiscriminate violence in the Middle East and his
claimed desire to settle Middle East political issues through negotiation. "If Arafat
didn't punish them, then he would be responsible before the whole world." Kifner,
Mubarak, Furious at US., Demands a Public Apology, N.Y. Times, Oct. 15, 1985, at A10,
col. 1 (quoting Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak); see also You Can Feel The Damage,
Time, Oct. 28, 1985, at 26 (interview with President Mubarak regarding his decision
to free hijackers).
30. Getting Even, Newsweek, Oct. 21, 1985, at 20, 22-23. One [intelligence]
source produced convincing evidence that ... the terrorists were still in Egypt and
that they probably would try to leave by air .... Intelligence sources [then] located
the plane the terrorists planned to use for their getaway .... There were signs that
the terrorists meant to fly to Tunis. Id. But see supra note 8 and accompanying text
(Egypt may have told the United States where to locate the EgyptAir 737 that was
carrying the hijackers).
31. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (safe passage of hijackers out of
Egypt to Tunisia).
32. See L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 263 (H. Lauterpacht 8th ed., 1955);
C. EAGLETON, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENT 87-88 (3d ed. 1957). The most important
right, and duty, of a state is jurisdiction. Id. Although the PLO is not a state, it has
been granted observer status at the United Nations, as well as the right to participate
in a number of international conferences on the Middle East. D.W. BowErr, THE
LAW OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONs 397-98 (4th ed. 1982).
33. Getting Even, Newsweek, Oct. 21, 1985, at 24. There is evidence that Tunisia
acted under pressure from the United States. President Reagan attempted to insure
that the terrorists had no where to hide, and thus communicated to the Tunisian
president that "the United States had reason to believe ... that the hijackers were on
board an EgyptAir plane headed for Tunis ... [and] believed the terrorists should
not be allowed to land." Id. But cf The Teflon Palestinian, The Economist, Dec. 2 1-Jan.
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Egyptian Boeing 737 to land at the NATO3 4 airfield at
Sigonella, Italy.35 On the landing strip there, United States
Navy commandos attempted to take the Palestinians into cus-
tody for trial in the United States.36 Italian police intervened,
taking the hijackers into custody. 7 Although the United States
subsequently asked the Italian Government to extradite the hi-
jackers, Italy asserted jurisdiction over them.3 8  Egypt, in-
censed at the diversion of their aircraft, awarded the crew of
3, 1986, at 25 (article asserts that Tunisia was a strange place for PLO headquarters
because Tunisia's pro-western government has been an uneasy host to the PLO).
34. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (background on NATO Treaty).
35. Gwertzman, U.S. Intercepts Jet Carrying Hiackers; Fighters Divert It To NA TO Base
In Italy; Gunmen Face Trial In Slaying Of Hostage, N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1985, at Al, col.
6.; Apple, Jr., Change In Course; This Time Reagan Let Action Do His Talking, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 13, 1985, § 4, at 1, col. 1; cf. supra note 1 and accompanying text (legality of
diverting commercial airliner).
A paradox has evolved from world reaction to the diversion of commercial air-
craft. Successful efforts at capturing fugitives have been applauded, while failed at-
tempts have been condemned for their illegality. See, e.g., Friedman, Israelis Intercept A
Libyan Jet And Then Let It Go, N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1986, at A8, col. 5 (failed attempt at
abduction). In a statement made following Israel's diversion of a Libyan commercial
aircraft on February 4, 1986, Abba Eban, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs and De-
fense Committee in the Israeli Knesset, said:
There is nothing that stands in more contradiction to the law than terror-
ism. But terrorism hides behind the wings of the law. What determines the
international reaction is the success or lack of success.
If that person [Abu Nidal] were on the plane, the free world would hail
our action. Since the effort failed, I assume there will be criticism on the
grounds of the need to respect the law. It is easier for me to describe that
paradox than to solve it.
Id.
36. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (account of confrontation between
armed forces of the United States and Italian police).
37. Id.
38. See Briefing By National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane On The Appre-
hension OfThe Achille Lauro Hijackers, Oct. 11, 1985, cited in 24 I.L.M. 1516, 1517
(1985); Gwertzman, U.S. Intercepts Jet Carrying Hjackers; Fighters Divert It To NATO Base
in Italy; Gunmen Face Trial In Slaying Of Hostage, N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1985, at A10, col.
3; infra notes 59-63 and accompanying text (theories supporting the assertion ofju-
risdiction over a fugitive); see also 7 M.C. BASSIOUNI, supra note 5, at VI § 1-1.
Extradition ... is premised on the assumption that the interests of a given
state have been affected by the conduct of a given individual who is not
within that state's jurisdiction but within the jurisdiction of another state.
The issue ofjurisdiction is, therefore, of utmost significance for extradition.
Yet, few, if any, treaties refer to theories ofjurisdiction ....
Id.; cf. 24 I.L.M. 1554-57 (1985) (warrant and complaint issued by the United States
against the hijackers).
For a history of the development of extradition as an international legal process,
see generally Schultz, The Principles of the Traditional Law of Extradition in LEGAL As-
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the intercepted airliner with Egypt's highest military decora-
tion for bravery.39 At this writing, the hijackers are awaiting
trial in a maximum security prison at Spoleto, Italy.4"
II. INTERNATIONAL LAW REGARDING EXTRADITION
A. The Legal Elements of Extradition
Extradition is defined in international law as "the rendi-
tion of fugitives from justice from one state to another."'" Ex-
tradition is premised on two conditions. First, an extradition
treaty must exist between the states involved.42 While a gov-
ernment might voluntarily surrender a fugitive, the legal right
to demand extradition exists only when created by treaty.43
Second, the requesting state must have a valid jurisdictional
claim to the fugitive.44
1. First Element: The Extradition Treaty
Egypt is bound by an extradition treaty with the United
States that was signed in 1874. 45 This treaty was recognized by
both Egypt and the United States at the time of the Achille
Lauro affair. Pursuant to treaty provisions, both states are obli-
gated to "deliver up persons who, having been convicted of or
charged with crimes . . . committed within the jurisdiction of
one of the contracting parties, shall seek an asylum or be found
within the territories of the other." 4 6
The treaty provides47 that offenses for which extradition is
PECTS OF EXTRADITION AMONG EUROPEAN STATES 9 (European Committee On Crime
Of The Council Of Europe 1970); Note, supra note 5, at 143-44.
39. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1985, at A13, col. 3; Russell, The Price of Success,
Time, Oct. 28, 1985, at 22-23 (photographs of crew being decorated by Egypt's Pres-
ident).
40. See Tagliabue, Italians Identify 16 in Hyacking of Ship, N.Y. Times, Nov. 20,
1985, at A3, col. 4; Hyacker To Be Tried As Minor, N.Y. Times, Nov. 21, 1985, at A10,
col. 3 (recent status of legal proceedings in Italy against hijackers).
41. 2J. MOORE, EXTRADITION 819 (1891).
42. W. FRIEDMANN, 0. LISSITZYN & R.C. PUGH, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 491 (1969); Schultz, supra note 38, at 21-22; Note, supra note 5, at 140.
43. W. FRIEDMANN, 0. LISSITZYN & R.C. PUGH, supra note 42, at 491.
44. 7 M.C. BASSIOUNI, supra note 5, at VI § 1-1; cf supra note 38 and accompany-
ing text (little reference to jurisdictional theories in most extradition treaties).
45. United States-Egypt Extradition Treaty, supra note 8; see supra note 8 and
accompanying text (relevant provisions of treaty).
46. United States-Egypt Extradition Treaty, supra note 8, art. 1.
47. Id.
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requested must be punishable under the criminal law of the
requested state.48 Neither state is obligated to extradite what
their legal system would consider an innocent person.4 9 The
treaty further provides that murder and attempted murder are
always grounds for requesting extradition,50 although the
United States does not recognize the right to request extradi-
tion for the murder of its citizens abroad5' other than senior
public officials.52 Ratification of the Hostage Convention53 by
the United States in January, 198454 following ratification by
the Government of Egypt in 198 1,1 means that both states will
extradite for the crime of hostage taking.56
There are no previous instances of Egypt avoiding its ex-
tradition treaty obligations with the United States.5  Yet in the
Achille Lauro incident, despite repeated requests by the United
States, Egypt neither prosecuted nor extradited the hijackers.58
2. Second Element: Jurisdictional Bases
International law recognizes five theories that could justify
a state's assertion of jurisdiction over a fugitive, and enable
48. Id.
49. See Schultz, supra note 38, at 12.
50. United States-Egypt Extradition Treaty, supra note 8, art. 2, §§ 1 and 2.
51. See Fugitives From Foreign Country To United States, 18 U.S.C. § 3184
(1982); Restatement (Revised) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
§ 402 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1981); Lowenfeld & Glynn, Analyzing The Applicable Laws In
The Achille Lauro Aftermath, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 1, 1985, at 3, col. 1.
52. Congressional, Cabinet, and Supreme Court Assassination, Kidnapping and
Assault; Penalties, 18 U.S.C. § 351(i) (1982); RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF THE FOR-
EIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402, comment e (Tent. Draft No. 2,
1981).
53. Hostage Convention, supra note 8; see supra note 149 and accompanying text
(background on the Hostage Convention).
54. See Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1873, 1976 (1984). The United States rati-
fied the Hostage Convention as part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of
1984. See id.
55. Egypt ratified the Hostage Convention, supra note 8, on October 2, 1981.
Multilateral Treaties Deposited With The Secretary-General 562, U.N. Doc.
ST/LEG/SER.E/3 (1985).
56. Hostage Convention, supra note 8, arts. 6, 8.
57. Neither official public documents, nor United States or international cases
indicate that Egypt has ever failed to meet the provisions of the United States-Egypt
Extradition Treaty. Cf. United States-Egypt Extradition Treaty, supra note 8.
58. See supra notes 21-40 and accompanying text (facts surrounding the hijacking
of the Achille Lauro).
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that state to validly request extradition: territorial, 59 passive
personality, 60 active personality or nationality, 6' protective
62
and universality. 63 These theories enjoy varying degrees of
recognition. 64 While each state might not recognize all theo-
59. The territorial theory ofjurisdiction enjoys nearly universal recognition, and
has been developed out of the international law principles of territorial sovereignty
and the equality of states. See I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAw 293 (2d ed. 1973). The territorial theory asserts that the courts of the place
where a crime is committed may exercise jurisdiction over a fugitive wanted for that
crime. Id.; 7 M.C. BAssIOUNI, supra note 5, at VI § 2-1; Sarkar, The Proper Law of Crime
In International Law, 11 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 446, 447 (1962); see also Schooner Ex-
change v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812) (decision emphasizing the rela-
tionship of sovereignty and the territorial theory of jurisdiction).
60. Under the passive personality theory ofjurisdiction, a state may assert juris-
diction over any fugitive who harms or threatens the welfare of its nationals abroad.
The passive personality theory is the least accepted and least justifiable theory of
jurisdiction. See I. BROWNLIE, supra note 59, at 296; 7 M.C. BASSIOUNI, supra note 5, at
VI § 4-1; see also The Lotus Case (Fr. v. Turkey), 1927 P.C.IJ., ser. A, No. 10 (Judg-
ment of Sept. 27); The Cutting Case, reported in 2 J.B. MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAw 228-42 (1908) (applying passive personality theory). A case applying the
passive personality theory without specifically mentioning it arose in 1866 when John
H. Surratt, a United States citizen who was wanted in connection with the assassina-
tion of President Abraham Lincoln, was arrested in Egypt and sent to the United
States. See 2J.B. MOORE, supra, at 259; 7 M.C. BASSIOUNI, supra note 5, at VI § 4-2; see
also Green, supra note 17, at 513 (citing the unmentioned application of passive per-
sonality in the Eichmann case).
61. The nationality, or active personality theory of jurisdiction provides that
states may act to protect nationals even when they are outside of the state's territorial
boundaries. See I. BROWNLIE, supra note 59, at 296. This theory is generally recog-
nized as a basis for asserting jurisdiction over extraterritorial acts. Id.; 7 M.C. BAS-
SIOUNI, supra note 5, at VI § 3-1; see also Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69 (1941);Joyce
v. Director of Public Prosecution, [1946] A.C. 347, reported in 3 BRIT. INT'L L. CASES
51 (1965); In re Roquain, 26 I.L.R. 209 (Belgium, Ct. of Cassation 1958); Re Gutier-
rez, 24 I.L.R. 265 (Mexico, S. Ct. 1957) (case law supporting nationality theory of
jurisdiction).
62. The protective theory of jurisdiction is a broad theory which extends a
state's sphere of protection to any of its interests endangered or harmed abroad. See
I. BROWNLIE, supra note 59, at 296-97. Nearly all states assert jurisdiction over fugi-
tives for crimes abroad which harm or threaten a state's security. Id.; 7 M.C. BAS-
SIOUNI, supra note 5, at VI § 5-1; see also Re van der Plas, 22 I.L.R. 205 (France, Ct. of
Cassation 1955); Public Prosecutor v. L., 18 I.L.R. 206 (Holland, S. Ct. 1951).; Nus-
selein v. Belgian State, 17 I.L.R. 136 (Belgium, Ct. of Cassation 1950) (case law sup-
porting protective theory of jurisdiction).
63. The universality theory of jurisdiction allows states to assert jurisdiction
over fugitives when the nature of their crimes justifies their repression as a matter of
international policy. See I. BROWNLIE, supra note 59, at 297; 7 M.C. BASSIOUNI, supra
note 5, at VI § 6-1; see also U.S. v. Dominguez, 604 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1014 (1980); Universal Jurisdiction (Austria) Case, 28 I.L.R. 341
(Austria, S. Ct. 1958); Rex v. Martin, 20 I.L.R. 167 (Norway, S. Ct. 1953) (case law
supporting universality theory of jurisdiction).
64. 7 M.C. BASSIOUNI, supra note 5, at VI § 1-4. For example, while France, Italy
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ries,65 those theories that a state does recognize are typically
codified within its statutes. In the United States, for example
the theories forming the jurisdictional basis for extradition can
be found in both the United States Code and the Revised Re-
statement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States.6 6
A territorial jurisdictional basis arises in the state where
the offense has been committed,67 or, according to the Law of
the Flag theory, on extensions of a state's territory such as
ships and aircraft.6 a Many states,69 including the United
States, Egypt, and Italy, 70 recognize this basis for jurisdiction.
Under the active personality or nationality theory of juris-
diction, a state may assert an interest in extradition based upon
the nationality of the accused. 7' This theory has been more
widely accepted when the crime committed by the fugitive has
also been committed against the requesting state or its citi-
zens.
7 2
Under the passive personality theory of jurisdiction, states
may assert jurisdiction based upon the nationality of the vic-
and Israel support the passive personality theory, the United States has only recently
considered adopting it. See Lowenfeld & Glynn, Analyzing the Applicable Laws in the
Achille Lauro Aftermath, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 1, 1985, at 3, col. 1; see also Antiterrorism Bill
Passed, N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1986, at A8, col. 2 (report that the United States Con-
gress passed a bill recognizing the passive personality theory).
65. For example, the United States recognizes the nationality, protective and
universality theories of jurisdiction. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
However, it does not adhere to the passive personality theory of jurisdiction. See
supra note 64 and accompanying text (United State law regarding theory).
66. See generally Fugitives From Foreign Country To United States, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3184 (1982) (transfer of offenders to or from foreign countries); RESTATEMENT (RE-
VISED) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402 (Tent. Draft No.
2, 1981) (jurisdiction to prescribe).
67. 7 M.C. BASSIOUNI, supra note 5, at VI § 1-4. A state's territory is "the physi-
cal sphere of exercise of [the] power to prescribe and enforce [state] laws." Id. § 2-2;
see supra note 59 and accompanying text (territorial theory of jurisdiction).
68. See, e.g., Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100 (1923); Chung Chi Cheung
v. The King, [1939] A.C. 160 (1939) (early case law supporting the law of the flag
theory); see 7 M.C. BASSIOUNI, supra note 5, at VI § 2-22, 23. In modem common law
the law of the flag theory has been applied to aircraft as well as vessels. Id. VI § 2-26.
This theory still enjoys scholarly support. See, e.g., Lowenfeld & Glynn, Analyzing the
Applicable Laws in the Achille Lauro Aftermath, N.Y.L.J., at 3, col. 1.
69. 7 M.C. BASSIOUNI, supra note 5, at VI 2-26.
70. Lowenfeld & Glynn, Analyzing the Applicable Laws in the Achille Lauro Aftermath,
N.Y.LJ., Nov. 1, 1985, at 3, col. 1.
71. See supra note 61 and accompanying text (nationality, or active personality
theory).
72. Id.
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tim.713 The United States, unlike Italy, Israel, France, and other
states,7 4 does not recognize this theory.75 Thus, with one ex-
ception, 76 the murder of a United States citizen in a foreign
country does not form the basis for the right to request extra-
dition.77
The protected interest theory of jurisdiction is a "long-
arm" theory78 that allows a state to assert jurisdiction when-
ever its interests are threatened or harmed abroad. Some
United States legal theorists recognize this theory in the Re-
vised Restatement of Foreign Relations Law only when acts
committed by aliens "pose either an actual or potential harm
to any vital interest of that state."' 79 Despite its potentially
broad application, there is no general rule of international law
prohibiting a state from asserting jurisdiction under this the-
ory.
80
While the preceding four theories all require a link8 ' be-
73. See supra note 60 and accompanying text (passive personality theory).
74. Lowenfeld & Glynn, Analyzing the Applicable Laws in the Achille Lauro Aftermath,.
N.Y.L.J., Nov. 1, 1985, at 3, col. 1.
75. See supra note 64 and accompanying text (non-recognition of passive person-
ality theory by United States).
76. See Congressional, Cabinet, and Supreme Court Assassination, Kidnapping
and Assault; Penalties, 18 U.S.C. § 351 (1982). The only instance in which the mur-
der of a United Stites citizen forms the basis for jurisdiction solely on the victim's
nationality is when a senior public official is killed while in a foreign state. Id.
77. The murder of Mr. Leon Klinghoffer, see supra note 28, did not form a basis
for jurisdiction. See Briefing By National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane On The
Apprehension Of The Achille Lauro Hijackers, Oct. 11, 1985, cited in 24 I.L.M. 1516,
1517 (1985).
78. See supra note 62 and accompanying text (protective theory); see also RESTATE-
MENT (REVISED) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 441, com-
ment b (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1981).
79. RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 402 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1981) (jurisdiction to prescribe).
80. Id.
81. See LORD RUSSELL, THE RECORD: THE TRIAL OF ADOLF EICHMANN FOR His
CRIMES AGAINST THE JEWISH PEOPLE AND AGAINST HUMANITY 307 (1963). Lord Rus-
sel comments
Penal jurisdiction is not a matter for everyone to exercise. There must be a
linking point, a legal connection that links the punisher with the punished.
The State may... punish only persons and acts which concern it more than they
concern other States.
Id. (emphasis in original); see also 7 M.C. BASSIOUNI, supra note 5, at VI § 6-1.
All theories [other than Universality] can be applied to a given situation only
if there exists some link between the state desiring to assert jurisdiction over
the offense itself, and the offender or the victim. This link can be: (1) the
situs of the offense, whether that location is the territory of the state or an
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tween the state requesting extradition and the fugitive being
sought, the fifth and final jurisdictional theory, the universality
principle12 is based upon crimes which affect the interests of all
states simply by the nature of the crime; i.e., crimes which may
be characterized as "crimes against humanity."83 An example
of the application of this international crime would include the
charges of genocide entered against the defendants at
Nuremburg84 and later in Israel in the trial of Adolf Eich-
mann.8 5 The United States has recognized this theory in re-
gard to acts of piracy, slave trade, attacks on or hijacking of
extension thereof. . . ; (2) the nationality of either the perpetrator or the
victim of the offense ... ; or (3) the effects of a given conduct outside the
state by affecting some interest that state desires to protect ....
Id. In the Achille Lauro incident, the "link" that gave the United States the right to
assert jurisdiction was the act of taking 18 United States citizens hostage. See supra
notes 65, 76-77 and accompanying text.
82. See supra note 63 and accompanying text (universality theory); see also 7 M.C.
BASSIOUNI, supra note 5, at VI § 6-7, 6-8.
Individuals... have been made subject to certain duties under international
law, such as the duty to refrain from committing piracy. The breach of such
duties will make the individual subject to prosecution and punishment
under international law .... Since there is [no] ... world body to prosecute
and administer punishment ... each state must act individually to enforce
the universality theory.
Id.
83. Roughly defined, a crime against humanity is an offense whose character is
such that it violates the common law governing all states. It is a crime that shocks the
collective conscience of the international community See supra note 63 and accompa-
nying text (universality theory).
84. See generally 1-8 OFFICE OF UNITED STATES CHIEF COUNSEL FOR PROSECUTION
OF Axis CRIMINALITY, NAZI CONSPIRACY AND AGGRESSION (1946); B.F. SMITH, REACH-
ING JUDGMENT AT NUREMBURG (1977); Lasok, The Eichmann Trial, 11 INT'L & COMP. L.
Q. 355 (1962) (history and analysis of the trials of Nazi war criminals conducted by
the victorious Allies after World War II).
85. The Attorney General of the Government of Israel v. Adolf Eichmann, 36
I.L.R. 5 (Israel, Dist. Ct. Jerusalem, 1961). Eichmann was indicted on twelve counts,
four of "crimes against the Jewish people," one of "war crimes," and seven of
"crimes against humanity." See LORD RUSSELL, supra note 81, at 5-7; Lasok, supra
note 84, at 356-57. But cf. Comer, The Eichmann Trial: HistoricJustice?, 23 GA. B.J.
491, 504 (1960).
Nuremburg was based on the proposition that atrocities against Jews and
non-Jews are equally crimes against world law. To define a crime in terms of
religion or nationality of the victim, instead of the nature of the criminal act
is wholly out of keeping with the needs of the times and the trend of modern
law ....
Id. (quoting Telford Taylor, Chief Prosecutor at Nuremburg). This statement criti-
cized Israel's application of the "crimes against humanity" charge in the Eichmann
trial as too powerful a legal tool in the hands of a sovereign state, and more appropri-
ate for use by international tribunals such as Nuremburg. Id.
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aircraft, genocide and war crimes."' In addition, the Revised
Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States
provides that although many states have condemned terrorism,
and terrorism is an offense subject to universal jurisdiction as a
matter of customary law, "it remains to be determined whether
universal jurisdiction over [terrorism] has become customary
law for states not a party to [an international agreement]. 87
3. Competing Claims to Jurisdiction
Applying these five theories to the facts of the Achille Lauro
affair, it is clear that Egypt was obligated either to prosecute
the PLO hijackers itself under the Hostage Convention,8 8 or
extradite them under the United States-Egypt Extradition
Treaty so that they could stand trial in the United States.89
Egypt's failure in both respects induced the United States to
resort to abduction.
Egypt could have tried the hijackers in Egyptian courts be-
cause custody of the Palestinians gave Egypt both de facto and
de jure jurisdiction over them. These rights arose under the
United States-Egypt Extradition Treaty, 90 the Hostage Con-
vention,9' and the territorial theory of jurisdiction.92 While
Egypt did have a strong basis for asserting jurisdiction,93 its
national interests prevented Egypt from trying the Palestini-
86. RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 404 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1981) (universal jurisdiction to define and punish
selective offenses).
87. Id. comment a.
88, Hostage Convention, supra note 8; see also supra notes 149, 8 and accompany-
ing text (relevant provisions of Hostage Convention).
89. United States-Egypt Extradition Treaty, supra note 8; see also supra note 8 and
accompanying text (relevant treaty provisions).
90. Id.
91. Hostage Convention, supra note 8; see also supra text accompanying note 8
(relevant provisions of Hostage Convention).
92. See supra note 59 and accompanying text (territorial theory of jurisdiction).
93. Egypt had the right to assert jurisdiction over the hijackers because the hi-
jacking took place in Egyptian territorial waters, and the hijackers surrendered on
Egyptian territory. See supra note 22 and accompanying text (Egypt's contiguous
zone); supra note 59 and accompanying text (territorial theory of jurisdiction). In
general, when two or more states have competing jurisdictional claims, the state with
the greater interest in prosecuting a fugitive will have the greater right to assert juris-
diction. See 7 M.C. BASSIOUNI, supra note 5, at VI § 9-3; LORD RUSSELL, supra note 81,
at 307.
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ans. 94 The United States' right to assert jurisdiction was not as
strong as Egypt's, 95 but the United States interest in trying the
hijackers was superior to Egypt's.96
The United States' only claim to jurisdiction over the hi-
jackers arose under the Hostage Convention. 97 The United
States does not adhere to the passive personality theory and
thus had no right to assert jurisdiction based upon the murder
abroad of one of its citizens. 98 However, the Hostage Conven-
tion,99 which became effective for the United States in January
1985 as part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of
1984,100 authorizes states to assert jurisdiction based upon the
nationality of hostages.' O' In the Achille Lauro incident, eight-
een hostages were United States citizens.10 2 Because Egypt
94. Egypt's position as a leader of the Arab world, and its sympathies for the
Palestinian cause, were clear factors in its deal to grant the Achille Lauro hijackers safe
passage to Tunis;
According to one Senate source, it's easy to understand why [Egyptian
President Hosni] Mubarak acted as he did; he clearly understood the risk to
Egypt's relations with the United States, Egypt is second only to Israel in the
amount of U.S. foreign aid it receives. But he was also aware of the danger
[Egypt] faced from ... Arab radicals. The Egyptians remember all too well
what happened to the late Anwar Sadat. Now, however [after the Achille
Lauro incident] Mubarak can claim he never gave in to American pressure
Getting Even, Newsweek, Oct. 21, 1985, at 31. Former Egyptian President Anwar
Sadat was assassinated by Arab radicals in October, 1981, as he reviewed a military
parade in Cairo. Farrell, Sadat Assassinated At Army Parade As Men Amid Ranks Fire Into
Stands; Vice President Affirms 'All Treaties, 'N.Y. Times, Oct. 7, 1981, at Al, col. 6. But see
supra note 29 and accompanying text (claim that Egypt was offering Yasir Arafat an
opportunity to gain greater credibility).
95. The United States' only claim to jurisdiction over the hijackers arose under
the Hostage Convention, supra note 8, because the United States does not adhere to
the passive personality theory ofjurisdiction. See supra notes 60, 76-77 and accompa-
nying text (passive personality theory).
96. See infra notes 180-82 and accompanying text (United States motivated by
desire to deter terrorist violence).
97. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (Hostage Convention); supra notes
60, 76-77 and accompanying text (passive personality theory).
98. See supra notes 60, 76-77 and accompanying text (passive personality theory).
99. Hostage Convention, supra note 8; see supra note 8 and accompanying text
(relevant provisions of Hostage Convention).
100. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat.
1873, 1976 (1984).
101. Hostage Convention, supra note 8.
102. Tagliabue, Ship Carrying 400 Is Seized; Hyackers Demand Release of 50 Palestini-
ans In Israel, N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1985, at AI, col. 6; see also supra notes 22-40 (back-
ground on Achille Lauro hijacking).
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had previously ratified the Hostage Convention,10 3 ratification
by the United States Congress was tantamount to an automatic
amendment of the United States-Egypt Extradition Treaty,
specifying hostage-taking as a crime for which either state may
validly request extradition. 11 4Egypt and the United States thus
had competing jurisdictional claims over the hijackers. 10 5
Either state could have prosecuted them for hijacking the
Achille Lauro, 106 and only Egypt could have prosecuted them for
murder.' 7 While there are no universal guidelines for resolv-
ing concurrent jurisdictional claims,'10  at least one expert on
extradition suggests ranking the conflicting states' interests,
giving priority to the most significantly affected state inter-
est.'0 9 Because Egypt neither tried the terrorists nor detained
them for extradition, but rather provided them with a "get-
away vehicle,"" 0 allowing the hijackers safe passage to PLO
headquarters in Tunisia,"' this issue was never confronted.
B. Why States Resort to Abduction
The development and acceptance of abduction as an ex-
tralegal alternative to extradition has been influenced by two
major factors. The first is the absence, misinterpretation or
abandonment of an extradition treaty." 2 The second factor is
103. Egypt ratified the Hostage Convention, supra note 8, on October 2, 1981.
Multilateral Treaties Deposited With The Secretary-General 562, U.N. Doc.
ST/LEG/SER.E/3 (1985).
104. Hostage Convention, supra note 8.
105. See supra note 93 (when more than one state can assert jurisdiction over a
fugitive, the state with the greater interest must prevail); 7 M.C. BASSIOUNI, supra
note 5, at VI § 9-3; LORD RUSSELL, supra note 81, at 307.
106. See supra notes 59-63, 88-91 and accompanying text; Hostage Convention,
supra note 8, at arts. 6 & 8 (legal rights and duties of United States and Egypt under
international agreement and theories of jurisdiction).
107. See supra notes 60, 76-77 (passive personality theory).
108. 7 M.C. BASSIOUNI, supra note 5, at VI § 9-1.
109. Id. at VI § 9-3.
110. Lowenfeld & Glynn, Analyzing the Applicable Laws in the Achille Lauro Aftermath,
N.Y.L.J., Nov. 1, 1985, at 1, col. 3; cf. supra note 1 and accompanying text (applicabil-
ity of Chicago Convention to the diversion of the Egyptian airliner).
111. Tunisia was "safe" in the sense that it is home to the headquarters of the
PLO. See supra notes 3, 8, 29 and accompanying text (background of PLO, location of
PLO headquarters in Tunisia and why Egypt sent hijackers there). But cf. The Teflon
Palestinian, The Economist, Dec. 21-Jan. 3, 1986, at 25 (assertion that pro-Western
Tunisia was a strange place for PLO headquarters).
112. See 6 M.C. BASSIOUNI, supra note 5, at V § 5-4; cf. Schultz, supra note 38, at
9; Note, supra note 5, at 143-44 (history and development of extradition).
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the willingness of national courts to overlook the means by
which the state secures a fugitive's presence for trial." 13 In the
Achille Lauro incident, the lack of a universally-recognized defi-
nition of "terrorism" was an additional factor influencing the
act of attempted abduction by the United States."
14
. 1. Treaty Problems
Extralegal alternatives to extradition are likely to arise in
four situations. The first might occur when two or more states
involved in securing a fugitive have no extradition treaty.'
1 5
With no legal processes governing the transfer of a fugitive, a
state may be induced to attempt an act of abduction in order to
bring a fugitive to trial."
t6
A second situation in which a state might be induced to
pursue abduction could arise when, as in the Achille Lauro inci-
dent, one of the parties will not honor an extradition treaty.,
t7
Egypt signaled its intent not to honor the United States-Egypt
Extradition Treaty by sending the Palestinian hijackers to Tu-
nisia,' and the United States interpreted this act as making
abduction a viable alternative to extradition."t 9
The third instance in which abduction might become a via-
ble alternative to extradition arises when two parties disagree
on the interpretation of one or more terms of an extradition
treaty. 120 The possibility exists when any extradition treaty in-
cludes a political crimes exception clause, 12 1 mainly because a
113. See supra notei 17 and accompanying text (mala captus bene detentus and back-
ground of Ker-Frisbie doctrine).
114. See infra notes 140-50 and accompanying text (no universally recognized
definition of "terrorism").
115. 6 M.C. BASSIOUNI, supra note 5, at V § 5-4.
116. Id.
117. Id.; see also supra note 8 (Egypt's treaty and convention obligations); supra
notes 22-40 and accompanying text (background of Achille Lauro hijacking).
118. See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text (discussion of why Egypt sent
hijackers to Tunisia).
119. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (factors which induced attempted
abduction by the United States).
120. 6 M.C. BASSIOUNI, supra note 5, at V § 5-4.
121. For example, political crimes exception clauses are subject to abuse by
states which expand the definition of political crimes to suit their national interests.
Statement of Abraham D. Sofaer, Legal Advisor to the Department of State, before
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Aug. 1, 1985, reprinted in Bureau of Public
Affairs, United States Department of State, Current Policy Report 3 (No. 762, Aug.
1985). Political crimes exception clauses, typically called "political offense excep-
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universally accepted definition of terrorism does not exist.' 22
Without such a definition, a state may deny extradition on the
grounds that the fugitive sought by the requesting state has
committed a political crime and is worthy of protection. 23
In the Achille Lauro incident, Egypt should not have viewed
the hijackers' crime as falling into a political crimes exception
because the Hostage Convention requires extradition for the
crime of hostage taking. 124 It is likely that Egypt viewed the
hijacking in a different political light than did the United
States.125 This may have been the result of the absence of a
universally recognized definition of terrorism, 26 or conflicting
national interests. The United States' political concerns were
to take a strong stand against international terrorism, and also
to deter terrorists from using United States citizens as primary
targets for violence. 27 In contrast Egypt's desire to play the
role of leader of the Arab world caused it to view the Achille
Lauro incident differently.' 28 Egypt's desire to maintain influ-
ence over the Palestinian cause, its fear of Arab radicals, and its
longstanding commitment to mediating a negotiated peace in
the Middle East, were reported factors in Egypt's negotiations
with the PLO regarding the release of the hijackers. 129
The fourth and final situation in which a state might be
induced to pursue abduction is when one state perceives a situ-
ation as requiring an urgent response to protect its national
interests. 30 In response to national political, economic, or so-
cial exigencies, a state may interpret the circumstances as sub-
tions," are based upon the notion that "individuals have the right to engage in revo-
lutionary political activity in pursuit of liberty." Id. at 2.
122. See infra notes 140-50 and accompanying text (no universal definition of
terrorism).
123. See Schultz, supra note 38, at 9; see also Note, supra note 5, at 143-44.
124. Hostage Convention, supra note 8.
125. See supra notes 29-33, 95 and accompanying text (Egypt's probable motiva-
tion in releasing hijackers); infra note 181 and accompanying text (United States de-
sire to deter international terrorism).
126. See infra notes 140-50 and accompanying text (no universally accepted defi-
nition of "terrorism").
127. See infra notes 180-82 and accompanying text (United States desire to deter
international terrorism).
128. See supra notes 29-33, 95 and accompanying text (Egypt's probable motiva-
tion in releasing hijackers).
129. Id.; see also supra note 29 and accompanying text (background on "deal"
between Egypt and the PLO).
130. 6 M.C. BASSIOUNI, supra note 5, at V § 5-4.
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stantially changing its obligations under a treaty. The defense
rebus sic stantibus or "at this point of affairs, '' 3 1 is recognized in
section 153 of the Revised Restatement. 3 2 In the wake of the
conflict between the United States and Egypt, the United
States was induced to pursue an act of abduction.13 3
2. Mala Captus Bene Detentus i
3 4
Unless a state's courts were to recognize or ignore the ex-
tralegal act of abduction, 135 the act would be meaningless. 36
Under the almost universally recognized maxim mala captus bene
detent us, or "improperly captured, properly detained,"' 137
courts will assert in personam jurisdiction 38 without inquiring
into the means by which the accused was brought before the
court. In the United States, this principle is known as the Ker-
Frisbie doctrine. 1
39
3. The Related Problem of Defining Terrorism
In the Achille Lauro incident the murder of a United States
citizen could properly be called an act of "terrorism," if such a
term were easily defined and accepted. However, there is no
131. Id.
132. See also W. FRIEDMANN, 0. LISSITZYN & R. PUGH, supra note 42, at 417. If a
state wants to invoke this maxim it must attempt to have its right recognized' by
1) other parties, or 2) some international authority. Id. at 420.
133. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (reasons why United States was
induced to act).
134. Mala captus bene detentus translates to "improperly captured, properly
detained."
135. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (discussing mala captus bene detentus
and Ker-Frisbie doctrine).
136. If a court refused to recognize jurisdiction over an abducted fugitive, the
abducting state's efforts to bring the fugitive to justice would be fruitless.
137. See 6 M.C. BASSIOUNI, supra note 5, at V § 1-2; see also Lowenfeld & Glynn,
Analyzing the Applicable Laws in the Achille Lauro Aftermath, N.Y.LJ., Nov. 1, 1985, at 3,
col. 2; RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED
STATES § 432, reporter's note 2 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1982) (support for doctrine of
mala captus bene detentus).
138. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 711 (5th ed. 1979). An in personam action is
one "seeking judgment against a person involving his personal rights and based on
jurisdiction of his person, as distinguished from a judgment against property (i.e. in
rem)." Id.
139. See Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886); Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519
(1952); see also supra note 17 and accompanying text (background on Ker-Frisbie doc-
trine).
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singular, universally accepted definition of terrorism.14 0 This
absence of an internationally recognized and accepted defini-
tion of terrorism resulted in both the United States and Egypt
interpreting the Achille Lauro hijacking differently. 4 ' Without a
consensus on the nature of the Palestinians' act, the United
States could not utilize existing legal processes 4 2 to bring the
hijackers to trial.
As early as 1934,14 3 the international community con-
140. For the purposes of this Note, "terrorism" will be defined as acts of
planned or indiscriminate violence directed against internationally protected public
officials (such as Ambassadors), innocent civilians, and privileged institutions (such
as schools, hospitals, the International Red Cross and the U.N. Peacekeeping forces).
"Terrorists" will be defined as any individual of any group, recognized or unrecog-
nized, engaging in acts of "terrorism." The type of activity included in thei definition
would encompass acts with political motives as well as those designed to create fear
and achieve violent results as ends in themselves. These actions do not further any
cause but merely disrupt personal freedoms and violate fundamental human rights,
mainly for the sake of publicity. See I L. GROSS, ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
ORGANIZATION 361 (1984).
141. See supra notes 125-29 and accompanying text.
142. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
143. In 1934, the League of Nations, following the assassination of King Alexan-
der I of Yugoslavia and French Prime Minister Louis Barthou, debated the need to
control and eliminated "political crimes." Id. In the League of Nations Council De-
bate on International Terrorism (Nov.-Dec. 1934), cited in 1 R. FRIEDLANDER, TER-
RORISM: DOCUMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL AND LOCAL CONTROL 217-51 (1979). M. La-
val (Representative of France) stated:
This debate would not be complete if we confined our discussion to the
past; we have a very important and delicate task to accomplish for the future
.... It is not a question of restricting the asylum which a State may think fit
to accord to political refugees .... A whole new set of international regula-
tions must be drawn up. Political crimes must be suppressed effectively by
international measures ....
Crime cannot be an instrument of policy.
Id at 218. M. Litvinoff (Representative of the Soviet Union) stated further that:
We cannot but be grateful to the Yugoslav Government for having
drawn the attention of the Council to terrorism, as one of the most disgust-
ing and most dangerous phenomena of international life...
We must do justice to [some] terrorists ... [those] inspired by the love offreedom
and the most progressive ideas .... [w]e cannot ignore the fact the [others arefinspired
in most cases, if not in all those known to us, by the most reactionary ideas ... which
consider it as their particular merit to struggle against Marxism, against that very
Marxism which.., has always been and still is the repudication and negation of terror-
ism.
Id. at 220-21 (emphasis added). In the resolution passed following the debate, the
League of Nations declared "that it is the duty of every state neither to encourage
nor tolerate on its territory and terrorist activity with a political purpose." Id at 250.
It appears that in condemning "terrorist activity," the member-states had in mind
state-supported acts of political biolence carried out on foreign territory, directed
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demned terrorist activity, but that and every subsequent effort
has met the same obstacle, i.e., states cannot agree on what
constitutes a terrorist act, largely because states strive to fit any
such definition within their particular political philosophy.
Between 1934 and 1937, a committee of experts named by
the League of Nations, attempted to draft a convention on pre-
vention and punishment of terrorist activity.' 44 Following the
Second World War, the United Nations attempted to formu-
late principles governing terrorism based upon the interna-
tional crime theories of law advanced at the Nuremburg War
Crimes Trials.' 45 After the failure of a draft code on "offenses
against foreign heads of state as an instrument of foreign polic. See id. at 220-21, 225,
228-29 (statements made during Council debate). Yet, the term "terrorist activity" is
nowhere defined in the resolutions on the matter. See id, at 249-51.
144. See Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, Nov. 16,
1937 [hereinafter cited as Punishment Convention], reprinted in 1 L. GROSS, supra note
140, at 361. The text of the Punishment Convention defined "acts of terrorism" as
"criminal acts directed against a state and intended or calculated to create a state of
terror in the minds of particular persons, or a group of persons or the general pub-
lic." Punishment Convention, art. 1, § 2, cited in 1 R. FRIEDLANDER, supra note 143, at
253 (1979) (emphasis added). It appears that the League considered terrorism to be
acts of state-supported violence directed against other states as a manifestation of
policy. More specifically, the Punishment Convention provided that terrorist acts
were to include:
(1) Any wilful act causing death or grievous bodily harm or loss of lib-
erty to:
(a) Heads of State, persons exercising the perogatives of the head
of the State, their hereditary or designated successors;
(b) The wives or husbands of the above-mentioned persons;
(c) Persons charged with public functions or holding public posi-
tions when the act is directed against them in their public capacity.
(2) Wilful destruction of, or damage to, public property or property
devoted to a public purpose belinging to or subject to the authority of an-
other High Contracting Party.
(3) Any wilful act calculated to endanger the lives of members of the
public.
(4) Any attempt to commit an offence falling within the foregoing pro-
visions of the present article.
(5) The manufacture, obtaining, possession, or supplying of arms, am-
munition, explosives or harmful substances with a view to the commission in
any country whatsoever of an offence falling within the present article.
Id. at 254. Primarily because the participants could not agree on a definition of ter-
rorism, only one state, India, ratified the Punishment Convention, and it never went
into effect. See I L. GROSS, supra note 140, at 361.
145. 1 L. GRoss, supra note 140 at 361-62. The result was a Draft Code of
Offenses Against the Peace and Security of Mankind. 9 UNGAOR, Supp. No. 9, U.N.
Doc. A/2693 (1954) [hereinafter cited as Draft Code]. This Draft Code met the same
fate as its League of Nations predecessor, it was not entered into force due to the
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against the peace and security of mankind,"' t4 6 the United Na-
tions efforts in the area of international terrorism consisted of
piecemeal responses to specific events. Thus, during the pe-
riod from 1963 through 1971, the General Assembly adopted,
and the United Nations ratified, three conventions condemn-
ing the hijacking of commercial aircraft. 14 7 Further attempts to
prevent and define terrorism were undertaken in 1972 by the
failure of sufficient numbers of Member-States to ratify it. 1 L. GROSS, supra note
140, at 362.
146. See Draft Code, supra note 145.
147. The first convention was the Tokyo Convention On Offences And Certain
Other Acts Committed On Board Aircraft, Sept. 14, 1963, art. 1, § b, which con-
demned "acts which, whether or not they are offences, may or do jeopardize the
safety of the aircraft or of persons or property therein or which jeopardize good
order and discipline on board." 20 U.S.T. 2941, T.I.A.S. No. 6768, 204 U.N.T.S.
'219 [hereinafter cited as Tokyo Convention]. The Tokyo Convention was followed
in 1970 by the Hague Convention For The Suppression Of Unlawful Seizure Of Air-
craft, Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. No. 7192 [hereinafter cited as Hague
Convention]. Th Hague Convention calls for the punishment of:
Any person who on board an aircraft in flight:
(a) unlawfully, by force,or threat thereof, or by any other form of intimida-
tion, seizes, or exercises control of, that aircraft, or attempts to perform any
act, or
(b) is an accomplice of a person who performs or attempts to perform any
such act
commits an offense.
Id. art. 1.
Finally, the most recent United Nations agreement defining and outlawing hi-
jacking is contained in the Montreal Sabotage Convention For The Suppression Of
Unlawful Acts Against The Safety Of Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 564,
T.I.A.S. No. 7570 [hereinafter cited as Montreal Convention], which provides the
following:
Article 1
1. Any person commits an offence if he unlawfully and intentionally:
(a) performs an act of violence against person on board an aircraft in
flight if that act is likely to endanger the safety of that aircraft; or
(b) destroys an aircraft in service or causes damage to such an aircraft
which renders it incapable of flight or which is likely to endanger its safety in
flight; or
(c) places or causes to be placed on an aircraft in service, by any means
whatsoever, a device or substance which is likely to destroy that aircraft, or
to cause damage to it which renders it incapable of flight, or to cause dam-
age to it which is likely to endanger its safety in flight; or
(d) destroys or damages air navigation facilities or interferes with their
operation, if any such act is likely to endanger the safety of aircraft in flight;
or
(e) communications information which he knows to be false, thereby
endangering the safety of an aircraft in flight.
Id. art. 1.
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United Nations.148 In 1976, the United Nations engaged in its
148. In 1972, the United Nations General Assembly, created an Ad Hoe Special
Committee in the Sixth (Legal) Committee, to prepare a study on Measures To Pre-
vent International Terrorism Which Endangers Or Takes Innocent Human Lives Or
Jeopardizes Fundamental Freedoms, And Study Of The Underlying Causes Of Those
Forms Of Terrorism And Acts Of Violence Which Lie In Misery, Frustration, Griev-
ance And Despair And Which Cause Some People To Sacrifice Human Lives, Includ-
ing Their Own, In An Attempt To Effect Radical Changes, 27 U.N.GAOR, Annexes
(Agenda Item 92), U.N. Doc. A/8791 (1972). The key phrase in this lengthy title is
"study of the underlying causes." From its inception, the Special Committee was
plagued by the inability of its members to establish any definition of terrorism, or any
proposal for the control, punishment, and elimination of terrorist activity without
first agreeing on terrorism's underlying causes. For example,
In the opinion of the Hungarian Representative: The fundamental issues in-
volve . . . [the] elimination of the underlying causes [of terrorism].
The Japanese Representative added: [All] terrorist acts which endang[er] or
take innocent human lives ... should be condemned ... regardless of
political or other motives ....
The Representative of the Ukranian SSR stated: [We remain] firmly opposed to
any attempt to use a campaign against international terrorism as a pre-
text for suppressing such national liberation movements.
The Representative of the United States said: [We can] not agree that work on
measures to prevent terrorism must await identification and elimination
of the causes of terrorism.
Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism, 32 U.N.GAOR (Supp.
No. 37), U.N. Doc. A/32/37 (1977) (debates concerning the definition, punishment
and prevention of terrorist activity), cited in 1 R. FRIEDLANDER, supra note 143, at 541-
48 (1979).
Also in 1972, an Ad Hoc Special Committee was established in the Sixth (Legal)
Committee to draft a Resolution On The Question Of Defining Aggression. See 27
U.N.GAOR, Annexes (Agenda Item 88), U.N. Doc. A/8929 (1972). During debate in
1972 on this draft resolution most of the representatives spoke of the importance of
defining aggression, as it would "enhance the effectiveness of the United Nations as
an instrument for the maintenance of peace, [and] provide . . . guidance and make
the existence of acts of aggression easier to determine... eliminating the elements of
indecision and subjectivity. Id. at 3. However, some Member States undertook
the traditional challenge by questioning "the feasibility of defining in a legal and
abstract manner something which was constantly changing from the political view-
point." Id. at 3-4.
The Report of the Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression,
29 U.N.GAOR, Annexes (Agenda Item 86) 2, U.N. Doc. A/9890 (1974), as intro-
duced in 1974 in the General Assembly, contained the following definition:
Article 3
Any of the following acts, regardless of a declaration of war, shall, sub-
ject to and in accordance with the provisions of Article 2 qualify as an act of
aggression:
(g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups,
irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against an-
other State ....
Id. art. 3. Ostensibly, with its adoption of that provision, the United Nations defined
and outlawed state-supported terrorism. Yet in statements made after the adoption
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most recent attempt to come to an agreement on a definition
of terrorism which would be effective in identifying and con-
trolling terrorist crime.
1 49
of the resolution, many Member States made it clear that the United Nations had not
agreed on a definition of terrorism:
Mr. Sanders (Guyana):
[I]t was impossible to produce a definition which would satisfy 138 States
completely ... the draft resolution ... [is] extremely fragile. Almost every
word [is] of significance and the result of really tough negotiations.
29 U.N.GAOR 6th Comm. (1471st Mtg.) at 42.
Mr. Kolesnik (U.S.S.R.):
In connexion with Article 3, [my] delegation [wishes] to emphasize that sub-
paragraph (g) [can] not under any circumstances be interpreted as casting
doubt on the legitimacy of struggles for national liberation or resistance
movements.
29 U.N.GAOR 6th Comm. (1472nd Mtg.) at 44.
149. At the request of the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Nations
General Assembly established an Ad Hoc Special Committee of the Sixth (Legal)
Committee to draft an international convention concerning the taking of hostages.
See 31 U.N.GAOR, Annexes (Agenda Item 123), U.N. Doc. A/31/242 (1976). This
Committee met in New York in 1977, and in Geneva in 1978 and 1979. In 1979, the
committee submitted a proposed convention which was approved and opened forgnature on December 18, 1979. See Convention Against The Taking Of Hostages,
1?4U.N.GAOR, Annexes (Agenda Item 113), U.N. Doc. A/34/819 (1979); supra note
"8. The Hostage Convention reads in part:
The States Parties to this Convention
Having in mind the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United
Nations concerning the maintenance of international peace and security and
the promotion of friendly relations and co-operation among States,
Recognizing, in particular, that everyone has the right to life, liberty and
security of person, as set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
Reaffirming the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peo-
ples as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration
on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
Operation Among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Na-
tions, as well as in other relevant resolutions of the General Assembly,
Considering that the taking of hostages is an offence of grave concern to
the international community and that, in accordance with the provisions of
this Convention, any person committing an act of hostage-taking shall be either prose-
cuted or extradited,
Being Convinced that it is urgently necessary to develop international co-
operation between States in devising and adopting effective measures for
the prevention, prosecution and punishment of all acts of taking hostages as
manifestations of international terrorism,
Have agreed as follows:
Article 1
1. Any person who seizes or detains and threatens to kill, to injure or to
continue to detain another person ... in order to compel a third party,
namely, a State, an international intergovernmental organization, a natural
or juridical person, or group of persons, to do or abstain from doing any act
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Legal and historical scholars and philosophers have like-
wise been unable to agree on a single definition of terror-
ism. '5 The questions concerning how to define terrorism are
interwoven with political theories regarding liberty, equality
and the right to rebellion against oppressive government. Be-
cause states adhere to a multitude of political philosophies of
varying shades, the search for identification and definition has
as an explicit or implicit condition for the release of the hostage commits the
offence of taking of hostages ("hostage-taking") within the meaning of this
Convention.
2. Any person who:
(a) Attempts to commit an act of hostage-taking, or
(b) Participates as an accomplice of anyone who commits or attempts to
commit an act of hostage-taking likewise commits an offence for the pur-
poses of this Convention.
Id. (emphasis added). By January 1, 1985, forty-eight States had ratified the Hostage
Convention, including the United States on Dec. 7, 1984, and Egypt on Oct. 2, 1981.
See Multilateral Treaties Deposited With The Secretary-General 562, U.N. Doc.
ST/LEG/SER.E/3 (1985). In sum, the international community, from the early
League of Nations resolutions in the 1930's to the reports and conventions drawn up
and debated in the United Nations Sixth (Legal) Committee throughout the 1970's,
has been unable to adequately define terrorism. As one scholar has noted:
Despite an elaborate quarter-century debate, the only aggression which the
world community has been able to agree upon is that of armed force. In its
definition of December 14, 1974, the General Assembly condemnation of
aggression dealt exclusively with state parties. But what of the actions and
activities of private armies and armed bands such as that of the P.L.O. and
its incursion into Lebanon? What of terror-violence as a means of irregular
warfare and the use of terror as an instrument of national or international
policy? .... It has become abundantly clear from many United Nations
resolutions, debates, and declarations "that groups fighting against colonial
or racist regimes are permitted, indeed encouraged, to commit unconven-
tional acts ... of terrorism." According to radical revolutionist Ernesto Che
Guevara, the first stage of a war of liberation is that "in which a small hunted
force bites the enemy ...." The way that "bite" is taken is the central issue
connected with revolutionary terrorism. To date, that issue has not been
resolved.
1 R. FRIEDLANDER, supra note 143, at 136-37 (citations omitted).
150. To one scholar, "terrorism is a barometer of revolutionary success ... a weapon
of the weak." B. CROZIER, A THEORY OF CONFLICT 129 (1974) (emphasis in original).
To another, it is "a use of force prohibited by law, directed to a change in the poli-
cies, personnel or system of government, and hence also directed to changes in the
existence of individuals in the society and perhaps other societies." T. HONDERICH,
POLITICAL VIOLENCE 9 (1976) (emphasis omitted). Philosopher Hannah Arendt, writ-
ing on the meaning of revolution, spoke of "revolution whose aim is freedom," as
well as that comprised of "rage of naked misfortune," which throughout history has
surfaced only to "[sweep] away rather than [achieve] in a few years the work of sev-
eral centuries." H. ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 21, 107 (1963) (quoting Condercet and
Robespierre).
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been difficult and largely unsuccessful. In the face of disagree-
ment between states, several important questions must be an-
swered before a common, universally recognized, all-inclusive
definition can be arrived at.1
5
'
The development and acceptance of abduction as an ex-
tralegal alternative to extradition has been influenced by extra-
dition treaty disputes and judicial recognition of state action.
In the Achille Lauro incident, the absence of a universally recog-
nized definition of terrorism also influenced an act of at-
tempted abduction. Despite obligations arising under the
Hostage Convention and procedures outlined in the United
States-Egypt Extradition Treaty, the Government of Egypt
failed to aid in the prosecution of four terrorists. 152 In re-
sponse to this decision by the Government of Egypt, the
United States attempted to abduct the hijackers and bring
them to the United States to stand trial. 153 While the effort was
not successful, the international community has met similar
historical efforts which have succeeded with acquiescence.1
54
151. These questions include:
Must terrorism always be associated with rebellion and revolutionary vio-
lence?,
Where does legitimate revolutionary action end and terrorism begin?,
When is rebellion legally and morally permissible?,
Under what conditions can revolution be legitimized?,
Can revolutionary violence ever be justified?,
What is acceptable in the eyes of the law, and what is not?
1 R. FRIEDLANDER, supra note 143, at 43-44 (citations omitted). The international
community is faced with an unanswered challenge whose answer is in greater de-
mand with each passing day.
Not only is the credibility of international law at stake in the ... debate
on terrorism, but also the type of world in which we and our children are
going to live .... [flailure . . . could only encourage increased resort to
anarchy, violence, and terror. It is hard to believe that responsible govern-
ments will, in the end, decide to run that risk.
Address by U.S. Ambassador W. Tapley Bennet, before the Sixth (Legal) Committee
of the United Nations General Assembly, quoted in 1 R. FRIEDLANDER, supra note 143,
at 151.
152. See supra notes 8, 149 and accompanying text (relevant Hostage Conven-
tion and United States-Egypt Extradition Treaty provisions).
153. See supra notes 21-40 and accompanying text (background of Achille Lauro
hijacking); supra, text accompanying note 8 (factors which induced attempted abduc-
tion by United States).
154. See Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886) (warrant for arrest could not be
properly served); Ex Parte Soblen, [ 1963] 2 Q.B. 243, reported in 8 BRIT. INT'L L. CASES
477 (1971) (plaintiff indicted for espionage in United States but fled to Israel where
offense was not extraditable); The Attorney General of the Government of Israel v.
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III. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY'S "HISTORICAL
ACQUIESCENCE TO ABDUCTION: THE CASE OF
ADOLF EICHMANN
Previous instances of abduction include the cases Ex Parte
Soblen in England, 55 In re Argoud in France, 156 and The Attorney
General of the Government of Israel v. Adolf Eichmann in Israel. 157
In each instance, agents of one state, acting under color of
law,' 58 unlawfully abducted a fugitive while he was seeking ref-
uge in another state, without the refuge state's consent. 59
In the most famous of these abduction cases, Adolf Eich-
mann was wanted by the Government of Israel for his partici-
pation in the "Final Solution,"' 160 the last phase of Hitler's plan
Adolf Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 5 (Israel, Dist. Ct. ofJerusalem, 1961) (previous requests
for extradition denied by the Government of Argentina for political reasons). These
are all examples of successful acts of abduction without serious international reper-
cussion.
155. Ex Parte Soblen, [1963] 2 QB. 243, reported in 8 BRIT. INT'L L. CASES 477
(1971). Dr. Soblen, a United States citizen, was convicted in the United States of
espionage. While free on bail, Dr. Soblen fled to Israel, where his extradition was
denied because the United States-Israel extradition treaty did not recognize Soblen's
crime as an extraditable offense. Id. at 477-78. Under a faulty deportation order. Dr.
Soblen was put on board an airliner and sent to the United States. Id.
156. Re Argoud, 38 Juris Classeur Periodique 13, 806 (1964). Argoud was the
leader of a military revolt against President Charles De Gaulle of France. Id. Argoud
was kidnapped from Munich, Germany, in February, 1963, and later sentenced to life
imprisonment. Id.; see also 6 M.C. BASSIOUNI, supra note 5, at V § 2-3 n.2 (background
of Argoud abduction).
157. The Attorney General of the Government Israel v. Adolf Eichmann, 36
I.L.R. 5 (Israel, Dist. Ct. ofJerusalem, 1961); see also infra notes 159-77 and accompa-
nying text (background on Eichmann kidnapping, trial, and hanging).
158. See 6 M.C. BASSIOUNI, supra note 5, at V § 2-7, 8.
For the abduction to be unlawful under international law, the abductors
must be public agents or other persons acting under color of law (not bona
fide volunteers) of a state other than the one where the individual was pres-
ent at the time of seizure and who acted without the consent of that state.
The definition relies on the notion that international law is designed to...
restrict impermissible state conduct.
Id. In the Achille Lauro affair, the attempted abduction was made by members of the
United States armed forces, clearly agents of the state. See supra text accompanying
note 4 (account of the attempt by United States armed forces to take the hijackers to
the United States to stand trial).
159. See supra note 153 and accompanying text (accounts of celebrated interna-
tional acts of abduction).
160. For background on Hitler's "Final Solution," see LORD RUSSELL, supra note
81, at 27-33. Eichmann and other Nazi leaders decided upon the "final solution of
the Jewish problem" at the notorious Wansee Conference in January 1942 in Berlin,
Germany. See Lasok, supra note 84, at 358; LORD RUSSELL, supra note 81, at 27-31.
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to exterminate the Jewish race. Expecting that Argentina
would deny Israel's request to extradite Eichmann, Israeli
agents successfully abducted him on the streets of Buenos
Aires, Argentina, on May 11, 1960.161 Eichmann was spirited
back to Jerusalem for interrogation and trial, 162 which began
on April 11, 1961.163 On May 31, 1962 Israel hanged Eich-
mann for "war crimes," "crimes against the Jewish people,"
and "crimes against humanity. "164 The reaction within the in-
ternational community to the successful abduction, trial, and
execution was generally favorable.' 65 Argentina filed a protest
with the United Nations Security Council. 1 66  The Security
Council passed a mild resolution condemning the abduc-
tion,t67 but there was little support at the United Nations for
Argentina's claim that the abduction seriously disrupted inter-
national peace and security.' 68 This mild response may be ex-
plained by the heinous nature of Eichmann's crimes, as well as
Israel's motives for pursuing the extralegal act.
The decision was made there to pursue a systematic program to exterminate 11 mil-
lion European Jews. Id.
161. See EICHMANN INTERROGATED: TRANSCRIPTS FROM THE ARCHIVES OF THE
ISRAELI POLICE XIII (. van Lang ed., 1983) (transcript of Eichmann's interrogation,
edited in collaboration with Claus Sybill). The kidnapping of Eichmann was inspired
when Nazi-hunter Simon Wisenthal and the Israeli Government failed to convince
Argentina to extradite another Nazi war criminal, Dr. Josef Mengele. The Argentine
Government denied the request on the grounds that: 1) Mengele's address was in-
correct; 2) his crimes were of a political nature. LORD RUSSELL, supra note 81, at
XXIV-XXV.
162. Eichmann "was found by Israeli security services and was bundled aboard
the [plane] which had brought [Israeli] Cabinet Member Abba Eban to Argentina."J.
Comer, supra note 85, at 491-92 (1960) (quoting Israeli Prime Minister David Ben
Gurion). Ironically, Eichmann was disguised as an elderly Jewish man on a last visit
to his homeland before his impending death. Id.
163. LORD RUSSELL, supra note 81, at XVI.
164. Id. at 5-6. But cf. Lasok, supra note 84, at 356-57 (1962) (criticism of appli-
cation of "crimes against humanity" charge to Eichmann).
165. LORD RUSSELL, supra note 81, at XV. The main opposition was, not surpris-
ingly, from the Arab states. Id. The United States also opposed the Israeli action. Id.
166. Letter from the Argentine Government to the United Nations Security
Council, 15 SCOR, Supp. (Apr-Jun 1960), at 24, U.N. Doc. s/4334 (1960).
167. 15 SCOR, Supp. (Apr-Jun 1960), at 34, U.N. Doc. s/4349 (1960).
168. See LORD RUSSELL, supra note 81, at XIV-XV. The resolution, while noting
that it should not be interpreted as condoning Eichmann's crimes, declared that such
acts [abduction] that affected the sovereignty of a state "might, if repeated, endanger
international peace and security." It further requested that Israel make appropriate
reparations. Id. Argentina never specified the nature of the reparations, and eventu-
ally Argentina declared the Israeli ambassador to Argentina persona non grata, and
asked him to leave the country. Id.
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Apart from the historical rationale for abduction, that all
legal methods of pursuing extradition through normal chan-
nels had failed,' 6 9 Israel relied on the nature of Eichmann's
crimes to justify its action. 170 Not to be confused with the
universality theory of jurisdiction,1 7 ' which justifies a request
for extradition when the fugitive has committed an interna-
tional crime against humanity,172 Israel's defense in the Eich-
mann case relied on the international nature of Eichmann's
crimes to justify the use of abduction. 173 The Israeli Prime
Minister, in a statement released after Eichmann's abduction,
stated that "very few people anywhere can fail to understand
... [our] ... feelings and appreciate the supreme moral validity of
[our] act ... [nor fail to] appreciate the ... tremendous moral
and emotional force [that] underl[ies] the determination to
find the chief murderer and to bring him . . . to Israel."'' 74
Later, during United Nations consideration of the matter,
Israel's Minister of Foreign Affairs stated that she hoped "this
violation . . . would be seen in the light of the exceptional and
unique character of the crimes attributed to Eichmann.' '1 75
The discussion of legal arguments supporting acts of ab-
duction in the Eichmann case is relevant to this analysis of the
Achille Lauro incident because the abduction of Adolf Eichmann
evolved out of many of the same. circumstances which
prompted the United States to attempt the abduction of the
Achille Lauro hijackers. Extradition was not a viable means of
bringing Eichmann to justice.'7 6 Israel had a jurisdictional
claim based upon acts committed against its citizens.177 Most
169. 6 M.C. BASSIOUNI, supra note 5, at V § 1-3.
170. See Letter From Israeli Prime Minister David Ben Gurion To Argentine
President Frondizi (June 3, 1960), quoted in LORD RUSSELL, supra note 81, at XI.
171. See supra note 63 and accompanying text (universality theory of jurisdic-
tion).
172. Id.
173. See LORD RUSSELL, supra note 81, at XI (letter from Israeli Government de-
tailing motives behind kidnapping of Eichmann).
174. See supra note 170, at XI (emphasis added).
175. Statement of Israeli Foreign Minister Golda Meir before the United Na-
tions General Assembly, quoted in LORD RUSSELL, supra note 81, at XII (emphasis ad-
ded).
176. See supra text accompanying note 161 (Argentina's continuous refusal to
extraditeJosefMengele led Israel to believe that the same result would occur regard-
ing Eichmann).
177. See supra note 64 and accompanying text (Israel does recognize the passive
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importantly, the nature of Eichmann's offenses created over-
riding moral considerations. 78 In the Achille Lauro affair, the
United States' right to request extradition was not honored by
Egypt.' 79 The United States had the right to assert ajurisdic-
tional claim based upon the act of hostage-taking against
United States citizens.' 80 Furthermore, the nature of the
Palestinians act, hijacking an innocent cruise ship and killing a'
defenseless invalid, undoubtedly amounted to a crime of im-
moral proportions.
After a rash of terrorist attacks all over the world between
1979 and 1985,181 many against United States citizens,'8 2 the
United States Government had announced a policy of direct
response to terrorism.'8 3 Thus, it is logical to conclude that
the United States acted to deter terrorism and bring terrorists,
personality theory); cf supra note 60 and accompanying text (passive personality the-
ory of jurisdiction).
178. See supra notes 170, 173-74 (statements by Israeli officials regarding the
abduction of Eichmann).
179. See supra note 8, 149 and accompanying text (Egypt's obligations under the
United States-Egypt Extradition Treaty and the Hostage Convention).
180. See supra notes 8, 149 and accompanying text (general provisions of the
Hostage Convention).
181. Between 1979 and 1985, the most notable terrorist acts have been: 1) the
seizure of the United States Embassy in Tehran where Iranians held Embassy person-
nel for 444 days in 1979 and 1980: 2) the burning of the United States Embassy in
Pakistan in 1981; 3) the bombing of the United States Marine compound and several
attacks against the Multinational Peace-Keeping Force in Beirut in 1984; and 4) the
hijacking of TWA Flight 874 on June 14, 1985. See Congressional Research Service,
Issue Brief on International Terrorism at 1 (Dec. 13, 1985) [hereinafter cited as CRS
Issue Brief] (on file at the offices of the Fordham International Law Journal).
182. According to a 1981 study by the United States Central Intelligence
Agency:
U.S. businessmen and diplomats have been the primary targets [of in-
ternational terrorists] with at least 38% of all events involving U.S. citizens.
In 1980, 112 terrorist attacks were directed against U.S. diplomats ... [o]ver
30%o of terrorist incidents took place in Europe with 20% in Latin America
and 20% in the Middle East.
CRS Issue Brief, supra note 181, at 4. By 1985, the number of terrorist attacks
against United States citizens had increased dramatically. Id.
183. At a new conference on June 18, 1985 following the hijacking of TWA
Flight 847, United States President Ronald Reagan announced:
[T]he United States is tonight a prisoner .... [I] am directing that the
following steps be taken:
I have directed the Secretary of transportation, in cooperation with the
Secretary of State, to explore immediately an expansion of our armed sky
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who might otherwise have escaped to justice.'8 4
A major difficulty in deterring terrorism and bringing ter-
rorists to justice lies in making the distinction between actions
in the furtherance of legitimate national liberation movements
and individual and group acts aimed merely at indiscriminate
killing and violence.' 8 5  States have acknowledged, and the
United Nations has recognized, that some forms of violence
must be accepted so that oppressed peoples can make progres-
marshal program aboard international flights of U.S. air carriers for better
protection of passengers.
I have directed the Secretary of State to issue an immediate travel advi-
sory...
I've asked for a full explanation of the events surrounding the takeover
of the aircraft...
I'm calling upon all allied and friendly governments to redouble their
efforts to improve airport security and take other measures to prevent the
hijacking of aircraft ...
America will never make concessions to terrorists. To do so would only invite more
terrorism.
Nor will we ask nor pressure any other government to do so. Once we head down
that path, there'll be no end to it. No end to the suffering of innocent people; no end to
the bloody ransom all civilized nations must pay.
President's News Conference on Foreign and Domestic Policy, N.Y. Times, Jun. 19, 1985, at
A18, col. 1 (emphasis added); see also H.R. Res. 294, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985)
(urging Reagan Administration to take every appropriate measure to combat terror-
ism); CRS Issue Brief, supra note 181, at 2 (Reagan Administration policy goals re-
garding international terrorism); cf A Shadow War Against Terror, N.Y. Times, Nov. 26,
1985, at Al, col. 1 (detailed history of terrorist attacks against United States citizens
in 1985); Merry, Report Urges Boost in U.S. Measures Against Terrorism, Wall St.J., Mar. 7,
1986, at 46, col. 2 (details of government purposes for anti-terrorism program).
184. See supra note 183 and accompanying text (United States policy regarding
terrorism).
185. See supra text accompanying note 4 (historical debate regarding terrorism
and the need to protect legitimate national liberation movements); CRS Issue Brief,
supra note 181, at 4-8. "There is disagreement . . . about . . . the dividing line be-
tween support for terrorism and support for 'national liberation movements.' " Id. at
4-5; cf. Jenkins, The U.S. Response to Terrorism: A Policy Dilemma, Armed Forces Journal
International, April 1985, at 28-31 (discussion of state-supported terrorism); Fried-
man, Armed and Dangerous; A Mideast Consumed by the Politics of Revenge, N.Y. Times, Jan.
5, 1986, § 4, at 1, col. 1.
[A]n always-present nihilistic strand in Palestinian politics is coming to the
fore, personified by the terrorist leader Abu Nidal... Abu Nidal is different.
He has no illusions about liberating Palestine . . . his is the politics of re-
venge ... [he] has been little more than a Mafia-style "hit man" for Arab
regimes and Palestinian extremists... violence is an end in itself. Abu Nidal
has no known ideology or plan of action towards a realizable goal for the
Palestinian people . . . Abu Nidal and his followers believe the rules and
limits of civilization do not apply to them.
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sive changes in their government. 18 6 No state has publicly en-
dorsed indiscriminate violence, 8 7 and nearly every state has
agreed that the elimination of terrorism is in the best interest
of the world community.'88 In the Achille Lauro incident, in-
volving the kidnapping of 400 innocent passengers and the un-
provoked murder of an invalid,' 89 it can be argued that the at-
tempted act of abduction by the United States was justified.
The argument that abduction is an acceptable action in ex-
traordinary situations has critics.' 9 0 After reviewing the moti-
vations involved in the pursuit of extralegal alternatives to ex-
tradition, one scholar has asked whether abduction is always
the solution when extradition fails.' 9 ' Another solution does
exist, i.e., making the laws of extradition more efficient rather
than allowing the abandonment of voluntary observance of in-
ternational legal processes. Frustration at the failure to
achieve extradition through normal channels, and a desire to
bring perpetrators of heinous international crimes to justice at
any cost, is a morally legitimate notion. However unwarranted
future violations may arise if states are placed in a position to
benefit from the use abduction.19 2
IV. CRITICISM OF ABDUCTION AS AN EXTRALEGAL
ALTERNATIVE TO EXTRADITION
Abduction technically violates international sover-
eignty,19 3 territorial integrity, 9 4 and internationally protected
186. See supra note 149 and accompanying text (historical debate regarding ter-
rorism).
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. See supra ntoes 21-40 and accompanying text (background of Achille Lauro
incident).
190. See, e.g., Lasok, supra note 84, at 372-74; Green, supra note 17, at 507-11;
Comer, supra note 85, at 509-11 (contemporary articles critical of Eichmann abduc-
tion); see also 6 M.C. BASSIOUNI, supra note 5, at V § 2-9 (list of major scholarly works
opposed to abduction and the principle of mala captus bene detentus).
191. 6 M.C. BASSIOUNI, supra note 5, at V § 1-3.
192. Unwarranted violations would include situations when states engaged in
acts of abduction based on false or dubious legal or factual grounds, knowing that
such acts will go unpunished. See, e.g., Comer, supra note 85, at 509 (historical hy-
potheticals); supra text accompanying note 1 (failed attempts of abduction by Israel in
1973 and 1986).
193. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (right of sovereignty).
194. Id. (relationship between sovereignty and territorial integrity).
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due process rights.' 9 5 Acts of abduction also violate interna-
tional legal process. 96 Relations among states become desta-
bilized when states resort to acts outside of treaties, conven-
tions, and those legal rules merely respected as time-honored
precepts. 97 But more than that, because adherence to inter-
national laws and processes is voluntary, 9 8 any encourage-
ment of action outside of formalized legal channels threatens
the very idea of organized international relations. 199
Several destabilizing world events stemmed from the
Achille Lauro hijacking.20 0 Egypt's President called the diver-
sion by United States fighters an act of "piracy," 20 1 and
thousands of Egyptians demonstrated in the streets, shouting
slogans critical of the United States.20 2 Other Arab states20 3
and the PLO considered the attempted act of abduction detri-
mental to Middle East peace efforts. 204 The Italian Govern-
ment fell, and United States relations with Italy, Egypt and Yu-
goslavia were strained a short time later when those countries
permitted the mastermind of the hijacking to escape.20 5
Abduction not only presages further international conflict,
but it also violates the basic framework for international rela-
195. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (international right of legal pro-
cess).
196. See supra note 190 (criticism of abduction).
197. Id.
198. W. LEVI, supra note 6, at 16-17.
199. Id. "International law.., commands support from states to the extent that
they perceive it at least not to be against their welfare." Id.
200. See infra notes 202-05 and accompanying text (destabilizing world events
following the Achille Lauro affair).
201. Getting Even, Newsweek, Oct. 21, 1985, at 31.
202. Id. at 32.
203. Jordan and Syria publicly condemned the hijacking. See Picking Up the Pace,
Time, Nov. 4, 1985, at 34-35; Arafat's Ship of Fools, The Economist, Oct. 19-25, 1985,
at 43.
204. See Picking Up the Pace, Newsweek, Nov. 4, 1985, at 34; The Price of Success,
Time, Oct. 28, 1985, at 28-29.
205. See Dionne, Italian Coalition Falls Apart Over The Achille Lauro Affair, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 17, 1985, at Al, col. 5 (Italian Government falls over mishandling of
Abbas); Getting Even, Newsweek, Oct. 21, 1985, at 31 (rift between United States,
Italy, and Yugoslavia over Abbas). After the EgyptAir Boeing 737 landed at
Sigonella, Italy, and United States and Italian forces boarded the plane, they were
surprised to find Abul Abbas on board. Abbas, a member of the PLO Executive
Committee, had been in constant communication with the hijackers immediately after
the seizure of the Achille Lauro. See Getting Even, Newsweek, Oct. 21, 1985, at 25.
Abbas later "escaped" to Yugoslavia disguised in an EgyptAir uniform. Id. at 26.
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tions as embodied in a number of important United Nations
agreements: 1) the U.N. Charter,20 6 2) the Statute of the Inter-
national Court of Justice 20 7 (ICJ), 3) the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, 20 8 and, 4) the Declaration of International
Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-Operation Among
States.20 9 The principles regarding international cooperation
embodied in these documents, arrived at through international
consensus, are intended to guide just and successful interna-
tional relations.210
The rules embodied in these agreements provide the gen-
eral framework for all international relations.2 l1 While states
206. U.N. CHARTER.
207. STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE.
208. 3 U.N.GAOR, Annexes (Agenda Item 58), U.N. Doc. A/3/217 (1948)
[hereinafter cited as Universal Declaration of Human Rights].
209. Declaration on Principles, supra note 6.
210. See J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 56 (1963). One of the sources of
modern international law is "[i]nternational conventions, whether general or particu-
lar, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states." Id. (quoting
article 38 of the STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE); U.N. CHARTER
art. 14. "[T]he General Assembly may recommend measures for the peaceful adjust-
ment of any situation, regardless of origin, which it deems likely to impair the general
welfare or friendly relations among nations." Id.
211. U.N. CHARTER preamble. The preamble of the Charter of the United Na-
tions states that the principal aims of that body are to "establish conditions under
which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources
of international law can be maintained ..... Id. Countries involved in disputes over
treaty and convention obligations are encouraged to seek first a solution by adopting
methods of negotiation, inqiury, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, or judicial set-
tlement. Id.
The Statute of the International Court of Justice similarly embodies the notion
that all conflicts between states should be settled peacefully and according to rules of
law. STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE art. 38. By agreeing to pur-
sue all legal ends through traditional legal processes, states are deterred from resort-
ing to extralegal actions except as a last, unfortunate resort. Further, by consenting
to the prescribed international legal processes, states maintain the foundation of in-
ternational law. See W. LEVI, supra note 6, at 16-17. The Permanent Court of Inter-
national Justice, expressed the importance of state compliance with international
legal processes in the Lotus case. The Court said:
The rules of law binding upon States therefore emanate from their own free
will as expressed in conventions or by usages generally accepted as expres-
sing principles of law and established in order to regulate the relations be-
tween these co-existing independent communities or with a view to the
achievement of common aims.
The Lotus Case (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 10, at 18 (Judgment of Sept.
7), cited in 2 M.O. HUDSON, WORLD COURT REPORTS 1927-1932, at 35 (1935). This
notion is similarly reflected in the roman law maxims, nunquam decurritur ad ex-
traordinarium sed ubi deficit ordinarium or "never resort to the extraordinary until the
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obey international laws and processes voluntarily, the interna-
tional community requires predictable behavior by states in or-
der to maintain peaceful coexistence and continued survival.21 2
Thus, it is crucial that states are not placed in a position, cre-
ated out of the historical acquiescence to abduction, in which
extralegal actions are encouraged. The political considera-
tions which lead states to avoid convention and treaty obliga-
tions must be addressed. Rather than allowing extralegal acts
of abduction to become the norm, extradition must be made
less political, more defined and thus, more effective.
The goal of modern international law is to enable states to
live together despite varying, and sometimes opposing, polit-
ical views.21 3 To be consistent with this goal, a plan to elimi-
nate terrorism must be based upon universal norms that do
not depend on any particular, narrowly based political ideol-
ogy.
2 14
V. STRENGTHENING EXTRADITION LA WS
A. The Proposal
Historically, traditional legal processes have failed to con-
ordinary fails," and ex injuria ius non oritur or "violations of law should not ripen into
lawful results." 6 M.C. BASSIOUNI, supra note 5, at V §§ 5-1, 5-2.
The Declaration On Principles, supra note 6, is essentially a consensus agreement
among Member States of the United Nations that elaborates on the meaning of the
principles of the United Nations Charter. Id. preamble. The Declaration on Princi-
ples proclaims that every state shall settle its international disputes with other states
by peaceful means, in such a manner that international peace, security, and justice
are not endangered. Id. art. I. Each state must respect the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of every other. Id.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 208, provides that every-
one is entitled to a fair public hearing by independent and impartial tribunals. Id. art.
10. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 207, further provides
that no person shall be subject to arbitrary arrest. Id. art. 9.
212. See W. LEVI, supra note 6, at 16-17.
213. See R. HIGGINS, CONFLICTS OF INTERESTS, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A DIVIDED
WORLD 101 (1965). The author states that:
[T]he very essence of modern international law is the ability of states to live
together in spite of fundamental differences .... [o]pposing political phi-
losophies have resulted in .. .damaging tensions and if there is to be any
generally accepted conduct of behaviour then international law must pro-
vide universal norms which do not depend for their existence on any partic-
ular, narrowly based, political ideology. The law of nations applies to both
dictatorships and democracies, to communism and capitalism.
214. Id.
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trol terrorism because of the increasing politicization of inter-
national legal processes. 21 5 This politicization has allowed na-
tions to manipulate international legal processes to suit na-
tional political exigencies.21 6 As the debates at the United
Nations Draft Convention Against the Taking of Hostages il-
lustrates,217 the political nature of terrorism, and the interna-
tional community's inability to define terrorist activity, have
prevented states from creating effective methods of controlling
the crime.218 More recently, the Yugoslavian Government reit-
erated the position of the Eastern European states that any re-
sponse to terrorism must be preceded by a study of its
causes.
2 19
These two examples support the conclusion that "states
value the international [community's] welfare only in propor-
tion to the contribution of that [community] to their own wel-
fare. '220 This conclusion, together with the fear by states sym-
pathetic to the underlying causes of terrorism that fugitives
215. See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
216. See C. DE VISSCHER, THEORY AND REALITY IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 70-
75 (1968). The author states that "[e]ntrenched in its formal positions, doctrine long
evaded direct confrontation of international law with politics." Id. at 70. However,
he states further:
The prime necessities of coexistence and reciprocity gradually introduced
among States the practice of modus vivendi which, in the normal course of
events, coordinate and reconcile their interests sufficiently for them to avoid
taking political positions too frequently. These necessities create solidari-
ties that are translated into common value judgments, develop a certain dis-
cipline, and promote the formation of legal rules. This legal integration,
product of history, is governed by factors ...[i]t is limited to goods or
values which governments have been brought by the exigencies of their mu-
tual relation to regard as objects of collaboration ... [i]nterests that govern-
ments hold to be intimately connected with the preservation or develop-
ment of state power must be classified as very generally refractory to legal
integration. Treaties that touch these interests ... spring from momentary
converges of policy ....
Id. at 74.
217. See supra note 149 and accompanying text (text of debates on the Draft
Hostage Convention).
218. See supra text accompanying notes 140-51 (brief history of international
agreements relating to terrorism).
219. See The Week, National Review, Jan. 31, 1986, at 19-20. In response to the
assertion of the Yugoslavian Government, United States Secretary of State George
Schultz said, "[h]ijacking the Italian ship, murdering an American, torturing and
holding a whole bunch of other Americans is not justified by any cause I know of." Id.
220. W. LEVI, supra note 6, at 16.
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would be subject to a politically biased jurisdiction,22 lead to
two conclusions. The first is that any attempt to control terror-
ism based upon the traditional extradition approach would be
fruitless. The existing international legal processes governing
extradition are not geared to incidents involving a multitude of
differing state interests.2 22 When states' opposing interests
have come into conflict, and it has appeared that a fugitive
might escape from justice, states have pursued abduction as an
extralegal alternative to extradition.223
The second conclusion is that successful international re-
lations rely upon the philosophical and pragmatic notion that
certain rules must exist and be respectfully obeyed.224 Despite
the international community's willingness to allow extralegal
acts in extraordinary situations,225 states must be able to pur-
sue measures necessary to eliminate terrorism without casting
aside legal rules and principles which are equally important to
international peace and stability.
This Note proposes a five step plan towards eliminating
the need for states to pursue abduction as an alternative to ex-
tradition. At the same time this proposal ensures states great
flexibility in eliminating terrorist violence.
The first step involves applying by analogy international
laws of war to the issue of international terrorism. This step
would seek "to establish some minimal standards of conduct
between .. .parties who have resorted to violence to settle
their problems. 2 26 Applying the international laws of war em-
bodied in the Geneva Conventions of 1949227 to terrorists
would allow states to prosecute, under international law rather
than domestic law, terrorist acts that victimize certain catego-
221. See Tharp, Jr., The Laws of War as a Potential Legal Regime for the Control of
Terrorist Activities, in INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 81 (A. Buckley, D. Olson eds. 1980).
States "[fear] that persons would not receive fair treatment in [a] foreign jurisdiction
either because of nationalistic biases or judicial processes which were considered not
to be of the same standard ..... Id. at 80.
222. See W. LEVI, supra note 6, at 16; see also supra notes 213-16 and accompany-
ing text (interrelationship between law and politics).
223. See supra note 154 (historical instances of abduction).
224. See W. LEVI, supra note 6, at 16-17; see also supra note 189 and accompanying
text (criticism of abduction).
225. See supra note 154 (historical cases of successful abduction).
226. Tharp, Jr., supra note 221, at 83.
227. Geneva Convention Relative to Prisoners of War, supra note 9; Geneva
Convention Relative to Civilians, supra note 9.
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ries of persons and institutions. This proposal would grant
prisoner of war status to captured combatants.228 If found
guilty of violating the laws, as would be most guerilla-ter-
rorists,2 2 9 those captured would be turned over to an interna-
tional judicial authority.230 Non-combatants and innocent in-
stitutions such as schools and hospitals would be accorded a
privileged status.231 Certain violent acts of particular cruelty
and inhumanity would be banned. 32 Although the application
of Geneva Convention rules to terrorist acts could be problem-
atic, 33 this step would provide the necessary framework for
determining when and where terrorist acts have occurred.
In the second step, acts of violence that violate the protec-
tive feature of the laws of war would provide a clear definition
of terrorism, separating rational acts committed in the pursuit
of legitimate aims and against legitimate targets, from indis-
criminate killing for the sake of publicizing a political cause.
This Note proposes the following definitions of terrorism and
terrorists, based upon an application of the laws of war of the
Geneva Conventions: 1) Terrorism is any act of planned or in-
discriminate violence directed against internationally pro-
tected public officials, such as ambassadors, innocent civilians
and privileged institutions, schools, the International Red
Cross, and United Nations Peacekeeping Forces; 2) Terrorists
are any individuals, whether or not associated with any political
or religious group, recognized or unrecognized, who engage
228. See Geneva Convention Relative to Prisoners of War, supra note 9, art. 4; see
also Tharp, Jr., supra note 221, at 83 (support for application of Geneva Conventions
to terrorists).
229. See Geneva Convention Relative to Prisoners of War, supra note 9, art. 5; see
also Tharp, Jr., supra note 221, at 83 (support for guerilla-terrorist exception).
230. Geneva Convention Relative to Prisoners of War, supra note 9, at art. 5.
The idea of an international judicial authority with jurisdiction over international
crimes is not a new one. See supra notes 143-50 and accompanying text (League of
Nations proposal for an international court, attempts by United Nations to outlaw
terrorism); Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, 9 UNGAOR (Supp.
12), U.N. Doc. A/2645, arts. 1-54 (1954); see also 7 M.C. BASSIOUNI, supra note 5, at VI
§ 6-8 (world criminal tribunal not a new idea); see generally B. FERENCZ, AN INTERNA-
TIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A STEP TOWARD WORLD PEACE (1980).
231. See Geneva Convention Relative to Civilians, supra note 9, art. 3; see also
Tharp, Jr., supra note 221, at 83.
232. See Geneva Convention Relative to Civilians, supra note 9, art. 3(I); see also
Tharp, Jr., supra note 221, at 84.
233. See Tharp, Jr., supra note 221, at 84.
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in acts of terrorism. 234
Applying the laws of war to terrorist activities will not only
afford protection to legitimate groups that employ political vi-
olence, but also will minimize violence directed at "noncomba-
tants" by terrorists whose only aim is to publicize their political
cause through indiscriminate violence. Creating a universally
recognized definition of terrorism and terrorists will clarify
what activity is outlawed by international laws against terror-
ism, and at the same time, provide a loophole for states that
are reluctant to identify terrorist groups for political rea-
sons.
2 3 5
The third step of this proposal would involve the con-
struction of an international agreement in which acts of terror-
ism, as defined by step two of this proposal, would be added to
existing extradition treaties as a crime for which extradition is
always warranted.23 6 No state could fall back on the political
crimes exception clause in an extradition treaty as an excuse
for failing to extradite a fugitive for a terrorist crime.
The fourth step is the creation of a permanent interna-
tional tribunal with mandatory jurisdiction over terrorist
crimes. This tribunal would loosely parallel the tribunal at
Nuremburg.23 7 Such a tribunal was proposed as early as 1937
234. See Geneva Convention Relative to Prisoners of War, supra note 9, arts. 3, 5;
Geneva Convention Relative to Civilians, supra note 9, art. 3. Political violence has
always existed. 1 R. FRIEDLANDER, supra note 143, at 6. For example, the assassina-
tion ofJulius Caesar on the Ides of March in 44 B.C., the Jacobin Reign of Terror in
1789, and the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand at Sarajevo in 1914, all
could be considered examples of such violence. Id. at 6-7. Yet, in recent years the
nature of terrorist activity has changed.
Violence, and with it terror, goes back beyond the dawn of history; contem-
porary violence stands on the shoulders of earlier fanatics. Terrorism, how-
ever, belongs to our modem, sophisticated technological age . . . modern
technology has qualitatively changed the nature of terrorism ... it has also
enabled tiny groups to wield enormous powers of destruction.
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 1 (M.H. Livingston ed.,
1978) (emphasis in original). But see 1 R. FRIEDLANDER, supra note 143, at 38 (support
for the notion that terrorism is a problem of identification and control); cf. Note,
Damn The Torpedoes!: International Standards Regarding the Use of Automatic Submarine
Mines, 8 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 286, 287 (1985) (arguing that there is a problem in ap-
plying laws and rules to terrorist groups that are not officially recognized).
235. Cf supra notes 8, 29-33, 95 and accompanying text (political considerations
which forced Egypt to release the hijacker of the Achille Lauro).
236. Cf supra note 121 and accompanying text (definition and explanation of
political crimes exception clauses).
237. Cf supra note 84 (Nuremburg War Crimes Trials).
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in the League of Nations.238 The United Nations has also sup-
ported the creation of an international tribunal to deal with
crimes "affecting a diversity of nations, men and interests,"
which "could not be dealt with by national courts defining the
interests of one particular people or nation. ' 2 9 No proposal
has yet been adopted, despite the good intentions of many
states, because sovereign states have been reluctant to relin-
quish this portion of their sovereignty. 240 In light of the recent
dangerous trend of international terrorist violence,24' unlike
that faced by the international community earlier in this cen-
tury in both scope and affect,24 2 the international community is
faced with a pressing need to make individual political com-
promises for the benefit of all states.
The fifth and final step in this proposal would add the
newly-defined crime of "terrorism" to the existing list of "of-
fenses against humanity. '24 3 Jurisdiction to try suspects ac-
cused of such crimes under international law would thus be
universal. 244 This concurrent jurisdiction would provide states
with great flexibility in the pursuit of terrorists, as they are de-
fined by international agreement, enforced by an objective in-
ternational judicial body, and without attendant political
problems.
B. Applying The Proposal To The Achille Lauro Affair
The facts of the Achille Lauro incident can serve to illustrate
the operation of the five-step proposal. Under step one the
hijacking would have been violative of the privileged status of
non-combatants, and the act of murdering an invalid in unpro-
voked cruelty would have been considered the type of inhu-
238. See supra note 144 and accompanying text (1937 League of Nations propo-
sal for an international criminal tribunal).
239. 1 L. GRoss, supra note 140, at 363 (quoting former United Nations Secre-
tary-General U Thant).
240. See supra note 221 and accompanying text (no state has yet adopted this
proposal because it would infringe upon their sovereignty).
241. See supra note 181 and accompanying text (notable acts of terrorist violence
for theperiod 1979-1985).
242. See supra note 234 and accompanying text (the changing face of terrorism
throughout history).
243. 7 M.C. BASSlOUNI, supra note 5, at VI § 6-1.
244. See supra note 63 and accompanying text (universality theory of jurisdic-
tion).
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mane violence banned under the rules of war.245 Under step
two, because the action by the hijackers violates the laws of
war, and regardless of their membership in the PLO, the Achille
Lauro hijackers would be termed terrorists. Under the third
step of the proposal, the hijackers would have been subject to
either extradition or prosecution in any state establishing juris-
diction over them. If Egypt could not or would not try the hi-
jackers, it would have had the option of turning them over to
an international judicial authority for prosecution under step
four of the proposal. Finally, under step five, any state would
have had the right and duty to assert jurisdiction over the hi-
jackers, including Italy, Egypt, the United States or Yugoslavia.
In effect, the hijackers could not escape the threat of an inter-
national warrant.
CONCLUSION
The failure of traditional legal processes to adequately
stem the rising tide of international terrorism induced the
United States to order the interception of an Egyptian airliner
and attempt to abduct the hijackers of the Achille Lauro. Histor-
ically states have resorted to acts of abduction when conflicts
involving national political interests have arisen. 46 The na-
tional interests of two allies, the United States and Egypt, were
at odds in the Achille Lauro incident, despite both countries' de-
sire to fight international terrorism.2 4 7 To avoid future acts of
abduction under similar circumstances, the international com-
munity must create a universal definition of terrorism, apply it
fairly through an objective framework, and oversee its enforce-
ment through an international judicial body. The threat of ter-
rorist activity is evident, and the future threat imminent.248
245. See supra notes 21-40 and accompanying text (details of Achille Lauro inci-
dent).
246. See supra note 153 (historical instances of abduction).
247. See supra notes 8, 149 and accompanying text (international agreements
outlawing or condemning terrorism to which both Egypt and the United States are
signatories).
248. See supra note 181-82 and accompanying text (chronology of major terrorist
incidents from 1979 to 1985); see also Hostage-Holders Make New Threat, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 1, 1986, at A5, col. 6 (declaration by Islamic Holy War that 1986 will be a year of
continued acts of sabotage, kidnapping, and attacks in the Middle East). Modern
politicians and diplomats might benefit from a re-examination of the confrontation
between the United States and Barbary Coast pirates in the late 18th and early 19th
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The international community must now work together to pro-
tect the innocent peoples of the world and the existence of all
civilized societies.
Andrew L. Liput
century period. After continual inaction and much payment of tribute on the part of
the United States Congress to Moroccan pirates kidnapping United States vessels
and seamen, Thomas Jefferson successfully persuaded the United States Govenment
to take affirmative action and end the piratical reign of terror. On the shores of Trip-
oli, United States Marines and hired mercenaries together forced the reigning
bashaw to stop terrorist actions against United States ships and seaman. See Shades of
1805, The Economist, Mar. 29-Apr. 4, 1986, at 26; Sorkin, The Piratical Ensigns of
Mahomet, National Review, Mar. 28, 1986, at 50. While this Note does not advocate
the use of force against modern terrorists, but suggests peaceful, legal means of
bringing terrorists to trial, this author believes that the international community must
pay heed to Thomas Jefferson's warning: "an insult unpunished is the parent of
others." Sorkin, The Piratical Ensigns of Mahomet, National Review, Mar. 28, 1986, at
50 col. 2 (quoting Mr. Jefferson in 1784 after the first hijacking of a United States
vessel by the Moroccan pirates).
